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Research On Pricing And Coordination Of Hybird Channel Supply Chain Considering Online Coupon Promotion

Posted on:2023-05-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J F LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569306776974009Subject:Industrial engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the rapid development of online shopping,many manufacturers build online direct sales channels to compete with third-party online retailers in addition to offline direct sales channels.Meanwhile,third-party online retailers attract consumers by issuing a large number of coupons,so as to gain certain advantages in the competition.However,the distribution of online coupons by third-party online retailers through complex promotional campaigns imposes additional costs on consumers and compromises the effectiveness of the entire supply chain.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the mixed channel supply chain under online coupon promotion and explore the interaction between pricing and marketing decisions of manufacturers and third-party online retailers.Combining with the current domestic reality,with hybrid supply chain as the research object,considering the third party online merchants online coupons,at the same time,the study of consumer behavior theory for supply chain decision makers reduction market trend towards more real,can indirectly reflect the third party online retailers difficulty levels of promotion plan,also can predict market changes to a certain extent.Based on this,this paper constructs a mixed-channel supply chain game model in which manufacturers play a dominant role and third-party online retailers follow.The consumer utility theory discuss how to divide the market situation,analysis compared the decentralized and centralized decision model on the offline coupons,pricing and profit equilibrium solution,numerical simulation parameters such as promotion,discount coefficient is discussed,travel costs for manufacturers of pricing decision and the influence of the third party online retailer promotion decisions.Finally,three contract coordination schemes are introduced to verify and compare contract coordination.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)whether centralized or decentralized decision making,the increase of travel costs will lead to an increase in online consumer groups,the most direct beneficiaries are the manufacturer of online direct marketing channels,and the third party because of the price of consumer preferences for online retailers to attract more consumers,so the increase of travel costs cannot make online coupons amount is reduced,Otherwise retailers risk losing market share.The only way to get a bigger market is to actually benefit consumers.(2)There is a negative correlation between the difficulty of promotion scheme and product pricing,as well as the coupon amount.In the case of the same promotional discount coefficient,although the product pricing in the centralized decision mode is improved compared with that in the decentralized decision mode,the online coupon amount of consumers can be improved more than that in the pricing mode,which is more favorable to consumers.(3)Online retailers’ promotional activities directly affect the profits of all parties in the supply chain.Under decentralized decision,promotion discount coefficient is inversely proportional to profit of all parties.If manufacturers and retailers want to make more money,retailers can’t design promotions so that consumers can easily get smaller online coupons.(4)Under the dual coordination contract based on cost sharing contract,the retailer’s promotion plan design is less sensitive to the influence of coupon amount,product pricing and wholesale price.Due to the promotion regulation of retailers by the dual coordination contract,online direct selling channels can achieve a more stable market performance compared with other contract coordination and avoid being overrun by retailers’ promotional behaviors.But the contract also limits retailers’ market performance.Under the coordination of the two pricing contracts,the retailer’s promotion plan design can make the product price,coupon amount setting and product wholesale price have more room for regulation.However,under the coordination of this contract,the biggest profit is still made by the manufacturer.Because the increased sales ultimately earn profits for the manufacturer,the manufacturer has a better profit performance under this contract,especially when retailers adopt relatively easy promotion programs.Online and offline integration contracts based on cost sharing can make full use of the existing market and bring a larger market to manufacturers’ offline stores,especially to those manufacturers who rely on the offline real economy.
Keywords/Search Tags:Consumer utility theory, Hybrid channel supply chain, Online coupons, Stackelberg game, Supply chain coordination Contract
PDF Full Text Request
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