Sino-US Currency Game And Risk Management And Control Of RMB Internationalization

In the era of "currency rights" in the financialization of the global economy,the internationalization of RMB has risen to a national strategy.With the significant increase in RMB-settled transaction volume,the efficiency of trade and investment has doubled,and the RMB has shown strong market competition.strength and development potential.However,it is undeniable that the rapid development of the renminbi has brought an impact on the profits of the incumbent currency,the competition in the international currency market is unprecedentedly fierce,and the currency game between China and the United States is unavoidable.Therefore,how to better promote the internationalization of RMB,manage and control risks,and the strategic choice between the currency game between China and the United States have become important topics of academic research and widespread public concern.Based on this,from the perspective of currency game,this paper is based on non-cooperative game theory,and combines theoretical and empirical analysis to achieve two goals: first,on the theoretical level,to study the process and strategy selection of Sino-US currency game;Second,at the level of empirical testing,it analyzes the risks and key influencing factors of RMB internationalization.In terms of method selection,the master-slave game Stackelberg model is used to simulate the game process between China and the United States;the valuation method is used to analyze the international net capital flow risk of RMB internationalization,and the OLS regression and quantile regression methods are used in the empirical part to analyze the risk of RMB internationalization.To verify the influence factors,the robustness test is used to analyze the impact of various macro variables on the risk of RMB internationalization.In terms of the structure of the article,the first is a review of relevant theories and literature,followed by the master-slave game analysis of the RMB and the US dollar and the discussion of the optimal solution of a single game equilibrium,and then the risk of RMB internationalization from the perspective of the Sino-US currency game It analyzes and finally summarizes the main conclusions,and puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for the risk management and control of RMB internationalization.Based on the theory of non-cooperative game,summarize the literature and find that in the era of financial capital,the U.S."unipolar" hegemony empowers the U.S.dollar and dominates the globalization of financial capital,which not only strengthens the hegemony of the U.S.dollar,but also derives a global currency that strengthens the United States.edge strategy system.The international currency game has changed from a winner-take-all game of the pound and the dollar to a duopoly game of the dollar and the euro,and then to a game of one master and many slaves dominated by the dollar and followed by other international currencies.During this period,the international currency status of the US dollar has been continuously consolidated and strengthened,on the one hand because of its strong hegemonic status,and on the other hand because the US can use the US dollar to transfer capital crisis to other currency issuing countries through risk transfer(such as valuation channels).The Latin American debt crisis,the Japanese crisis,the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis are all inseparable from the currency game: the non-cooperative game in the international currency market is the cause of the crisis,and the promotion of currency internationalization is the game currency "non-country".The game equilibria and process can provide crisis relief and preventive measures.Based above,from the perspective of game theory,combined with the realistic background of the obvious gap in the status of international currencies,the game pattern and game types of RMB and the US dollar are discussed,and the more realistic master-slave game Stackelberg model is used.Dynamic process analysis.There are four types of strategy combinations,both China and the United States tacitly cooperate or compete,or only one side tacitly cooperates.The results of a single game equilibrium under the condition of complete information show that China and the United States face an obvious "prisoner’s dilemma" in the short-term game.Regardless of each other’s strategy,both sides will choose a competitive strategy,corresponding to a unique Nash equilibrium.From the perspective of empirical testing,according to the logic of theoretical hypothesis-empirical verification,the following conclusions are obtained.(1)The impact of the Sino-US currency game on the risk of RMB internationalization mainly includes two channels: exchange rate channels and asset price channels.Interest rate factors also play a role,but they are mainly indirect.Usually,they indirectly affect the risk of international net capital flows through exchange rate channels and asset price channels.(2)During the period between the official start of RMB internationalization and the deepening of the nationalization process,the fluctuation of the risk of China’s international net capital flow has increased significantly,but the overall trend has been declining.This shows that the benefits brought by currency internationalization are higher than the risk costs,and the in-depth internationalization of the RMB is conducive to the weakening and prevention of external risks.(3)The impact of the selected core explanatory variables on the risk of RMB internationalization and The direction is consistent with the empirical results in this chapter.The more detailed the research and analysis of the influencing factors,the more targeted the countermeasures for the risk management and control of RMB internationalization,so as to continuously promote the improvement of management efficiency.First,in each stage of RMB internationalization,the real effective exchange rate index can significantly negatively affect the risk of RMB internationalization;the volatility index,that is,the panic index,is the opposite.Second,before and after the official launch of RMB internationalization,the faster the Chinese economy develops and the lower the inflation rate,the higher the valuation returns and the lower the risk of RMB internationalization.A higher growth rate of money supply and the proportion of equity liabilities in assets and liabilities can temporarily reduce the risk of RMB internationalization,but the sum of debts in assets and liabilities,and the ratio of exports to imports are the opposite.Third,in the initial stage and acceleration stage of RMB internationalization,the adjustment role of foreign exchange reserves has increased,and the proportion of foreign exchange reserves has a significant negative impact on the risk of China’s international net capital flow,and the growth rate of broad money can also temporarily contribute to it.