Non-cooperative Game And Cooperative Game Analysis Of The Members Among CLSC Channel

As the consciousness of environmental protection have been around, governments around the world have empowered the legislation of the environmental protection, and some laws and regulations have been worked out to require company to recycle and reproduce the disposed old products, Therefore, more and more enterprises start to take closed-loop supply chain management into enterprise development strategy system.Non-cooperative game and cooperative game were both taken to analyze two issues of the channel management of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), one is how to select the right recycling channel, and another is how to distribute the profit of the channels alliance.The recycling channel selection issue of the CLSC was discussed first. Three kinds of recycling mode of CLSC were discussed base on Stackelberg game to find out the optimal pricing strategy under the mode of decentralized decision, by comparing the results, it was found that if the recycling costs of the three members (manufacturer, retailer, third-party recovery) are same, the manufacturer would be the best choice to take the charge of recycling. And if the costs are not the same, the prerequisite of the recycling cost under the best channel model were presented either.Then the profit distribution issues for the CLSC alliance was discussed based on cooperative game. By comparing the optimal values under the mode of concentrated decision-making with the ones under the mode of decentralized decision, it was found that corporation can bring more profits of the CLSC system, and the increased profits were distributed according to the Shapley values among the CLSC members, and the profit of every member was increased fairly.