| Information disclosure is the main channel through which listed companies transmit information to investors or other stakeholders,and constitutes the core basis for most investors to choose investment targets.Therefore,strict regulation of the quality of information disclosure is a necessary condition for shaping an efficient and stable capital market.The performance disclosure of listed companies is divided into financial information disclosure and non-financial information disclosure.At present,the supervision of listed companies’ annual reports mainly focuses on the review of financial information,and the disclosure of non-financial information by the main body of annual report has a small compliance risk.The portion of the annual report’s non-financial information that explains current performance is often referred to as performance attribution.Listed companies often use self-interested performance attribution to cover up management mistakes or magnify possible credits.In contrast,earnings management is mainly aimed at the manipulation of financial information,and there are often extensive earnings management behaviors in under performing companies in my country’s stock market.However,when companies improve current operating results through earnings management,they usually avoid mentioning this factor in performance attribution,but attribute the increase in performance to the improvement of the company’s management level to cover up the existing earnings management behavior in the current period.Investors build a good impression.There are usually two situations in which listed companies distort the performance status in the annual report,namely,the manipulation of financial information and the manipulation of non-financial information.These two behaviors are called self-interested performance attribution and earnings management.Based on the strong correlation between performance attribution and earnings management,this paper analyzes the beautification behavior of listed companies on financial and non-financial information from these two angles at the same time,which can more effectively interpret the company’s real operating results.In the context of policies such as "carbon neutrality" and "carbon peaking",energy conservation and emission reduction,as a long-term focus of the Chinese government,is related to all aspects of enterprise production and operation.As a renewable and clean energy source,wind power has gradually attracted attention from all parties.Our country’s wind power industry has grown rapidly under the high subsidies of the state.However,the overall development quality of the wind power industry is not optimistic,most companies have poor profitability,lack of core technologies,and weak R&D capabilities and other problems that need to be improved urgently.This paper selects Xiangdian,a listed company in the wind power industry,as the research object.First of all,it analyzes the current situation of Xiangdian Corporation’s operation based on the industry background,and then sorts out the performance attribution of Xiangdian Corporation for the year of poor performance and the year of turning losses,and analyzes the rationality item by item.This paper analyzes the motivation and means of the earnings management behavior of Xiangdian Co.,Ltd.in order to explore the real reasons for the change of performance and analyze the internal connection and reflection problems between the two.Then,combined with the company’s situation of external supervision,the sale of subsidiaries and non-directional issuance and other matters,it analyzes the adverse effects of self-interested performance attribution and earnings management behavior on the company.Based on the above,suggestions are made from the perspective of external supervision and corporate governance to help promote the healthy and sustainable development of my country’s securities market. |
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