Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Community Group Buying Platform Supply Chain Under Information Asymmetry

With the rapid development of the e-commerce market,the community group buying model based on neighborhood social interaction has emerged as the times require.This model mainly relies on effective collaboration between the platform and the team leader close to the consumer end,and jointly constructs a supply chain model with the platform as the core.Specifically,the platform is responsible for product selection and logistics distribution,while the team leader is responsible for terminal promotion and customer relationship maintenance(collectively referred to as effort level in this article).Practice has proven that the level of effort of the team leader directly affects the operational efficiency of the supply chain and the profits of both parties.Therefore,the platform needs to explore scientific and effective incentive mechanisms to promote team leaders to make decisions conducive to maximizing the benefits of both parties.This article aims to explore how to design such a mechanism to optimize the operational effectiveness of community group buying and maximize overall revenue.This article introduces the basic structure and characteristics of the community group purchase supply chain,and summarizes the domestic and foreign literature and theoretical basis.Firstly,based on the operation mode and influencing factors of the community group purchase supply chain,an incentive model in a single task environment is established and solved.Then,considering the complexity of a multitasking environment,the multi-dimensional aspects of the leader’s task in the community group purchase supply chain are considered,and the incentive mechanism in the multitasking environment is studied.Finally,conclusions are drawn based on correlation analysis.The results show that: first,the effort level of the team leader is positively correlated with the incentive intensity,but negatively correlated with the team leader’s effort cost coefficient,team leader’s risk aversion level,and external factors;Secondly,the effort cost coefficient,risk aversion level,and exogenous variables of the team leader are negatively correlated with the platform’s revenue;Thirdly,the greater the risk aversion tendency of the team leader,the higher the agency cost.The greater the effort cost coefficient of the team leader,the lower the agency cost,and there is a negative correlation between the two;Fourth,there is a negative correlation between the level of risk aversion,the effort cost coefficient,and external factors of the team leader and the incentive intensity of the team leader;Fifth,when the three tasks are interdependent,the complementary performance between tasks improves the overall incentive effectiveness of the system,while the substitutability between tasks weakens the overall incentive effectiveness of the system.Based on the above conclusions,the following suggestions can be drawn: First,group buying platforms should choose group leaders with low risk aversion and strong ability to cooperate,thereby reducing agency costs and improving their own profits;Secondly,with a low level of risk aversion by group leaders,a small effort cost coefficient for group leaders,and small external influencing factors,the group purchase platform can improve the incentive intensity.On the contrary,there is no need for too much incentive;Thirdly,in order to improve the overall incentive effect,group buying platforms should seek to transform alternative tasks into complementary tasks.By establishing an incentive mechanism for community group purchase supply chain,this study,on the one hand,introduces relevant theories into the context of community group purchase supply chain,expanding relevant research in the field of community group purchase supply chain;On the other hand,it reveals the impact of different factors on each other,and how to mobilize the enthusiasm of team leaders through incentive mechanisms to guide supply chain management decisions in practice.