Study On The Impact Of Equity Pledge Of Controlling Shareholders On Dual Innovation Of Enterprises

Since the state allowed securities firms to carry out equity pledge business in2013,the scale of equity pledge in China’s securities market has risen sharply,which has had a far-reaching impact on micro enterprise behavior and macro capital market.However,the popularity of equity pledge is also accompanied by certain risks,after the controlling shareholder pledges the shares in its hand,the risk of its control transfer increases,and the tendency of the controlling shareholder to engage in opportunistic behavior increases.In addition to the leverage risk itself,equity pledge will also indirectly affect the long-term development of enterprises,and its economic consequences deserve in-depth study.At the same time,as innovation-driven development has become a new model of China’s economic development,the government has issued a series of policies to promote enterprises to carry out innovation activities and improve their innovation capabilities.However,according to the dual innovation theory,the innovation activities of enterprises can be divided into exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation according to the characteristics of organizational innovation.This paper first sorts out the main literature of domestic and foreign equity pledge and enterprise ambidextrous innovation research through literature review,summarizes the relevant research conclusions,and clarifies the relevant theories used in this paper,including principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory.Secondly,taking A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2021 as the research object,the hybrid OLS regression model is used for empirical testing,and the impact of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on ambidextrous innovation is studied.Then,based on the main effect regression,this paper also examines the mediating role of the second type of agency cost and internal control of enterprises in the dual innovation of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge influence.Finally,in further analysis,the impact of enterprise scale and whether it is a high-tech enterprise on the main effect is studied.The results show that the equity pledge of controlling shareholders is negatively correlated with enterprise exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation.Equity pledge of controlling shareholders affects dual innovation by increasing the second type of agency cost and reducing the internal control of enterprises;The inhibitory effect of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on dual innovation is more obvious in large-scale enterprises and high-tech enterprises.The main contributions of this study are:(1)few studies pay attention to the relationship between equity pledge and enterprise ambidexterary innovation,and this paper enriches the research content of the economic consequences of equity pledge,which can provide new ideas for the influencing factors of enterprise ambidexterary innovation;(2)This paper studies the mediating effect of the second type of agency cost and internal control in the process of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge affecting the dual innovation of enterprises,and the analysis of the specific mechanism can provide theoretical support for the negative economic consequences of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge.(3)Based on the research conclusions,this paper provides targeted suggestions,which can provide reference for enterprises to further standardize equity pledge business and improve the level of dual innovation.