| As environmental and energy issues become increasingly severe,low-carbon consumption has become not only a market demand trend,but also an important feature of supply chain coordination level.The dual-channel marketing model has become the norm in fresh food supply chains,and achieving channel win-win has become a current research hotspot.When purchasing fresh food,consumers not only pay attention to freshness,but also to carbon emissions.The research in this article not only enriches the coordination theory of dual-channel fresh food supply chains,but also provides important decision-making reference for governments and enterprises,with good academic value and practical guidance significance.Thesis focuses on the operational decision-making and coordination issues in a dual-channel fresh food supply chain,and explores the factors affecting decisionmaking of supply chain members by applying game theory,taking into account consumer preferences for both freshness and low-carbon emissions,and supplier measures for carbon reduction and preservation.Under the background of carbon trading policies,the study reveals that improving consumer preferences for freshness and low-carbon emissions and increasing suppliers’ carbon reduction efficiency can enhance the profitability of the supply chain.Moreover,an increase in initial carbon quotas also has a positive impact on the supply chain’s decision-making.However,higher preservation and carbon reduction costs for suppliers may lead to increased carbon emissions,which will negatively affect supply chain decisions and profits.Therefore,supply chain members should fully consider the relationship between carbon reduction and preservation,and make decisions based on consumer preferences for lowcarbon emissions,as well as other factors such as carbon trading policies,to achieve the optimal decision-making effect.Thesis further considers government subsidies and studies their impact on decision-making by members of the fresh dual-channel supply chain.The research results show that government subsidies for carbon reduction costs can stimulate suppliers to improve their levels of preservation and carbon reduction,thereby increasing the profits of supply chain members.However,excessive subsidies can lead to a "free-rider" phenomenon for retailers,which can reduce supplier enthusiasm for reducing emissions.Therefore,it is necessary to control the scope of subsidies reasonably to improve the decision-making and profits of the supply chain.Thesis proposes a profit-sharing and transfer payment combination contract coordination mechanism for the conflicts,double marginalization effects,and freeriding problems in the fresh dual-channel supply chain,through centralized and decentralized decision-making analysis.When the profit-sharing ratio and transfer payment cost are within a certain range,the mechanism achieves a reasonable distribution of total profits and overall profit improvement for the supply chain.From the perspective of channel cooperation and profit maximization,this mechanism can help supply chain members achieve optimal decision-making and performance. |