Influence Of Marketization Of Industrial Land Transfer On Enterprise’s Innovation Ablity

Looking back at the past decade or so of land market reform,a large amount of industrial land has been granted in a non-market way,and illegal land grants have been commonplace.The release of documents such as the Notice of the State Council on Strengthening Land Control(Guo Fa [2006] No.31)and the Regulations on the Sale of State-owned Construction Land by Bidding,Auction and Bidding(i.e.,"Decree 39")established the official launch of the policy to promote the marketization of industrial land sales.However,the local government is subject to the double pressure of "financial mismatch" and "promotion game" of officials,and based on China’s special land property rights system,it adopts the "land to attract investment" approach to quickly drive local economic development.The price of commercial and residential land has become an opportunity for local governments to relieve financial pressure.Land is an important link between government and enterprises,and enterprises are the main body of technological innovation,while land is one of the necessary input factors for enterprises to carry out innovation activities.Therefore,in this context,the government’s continuous promotion of land transfer market reform through the land factor channel will certainly have some impact on the behavior of enterprises.Most of the existing literature studies the impact of land marketization at the regional macro level,but does not consider the possible impact of land concessions on the innovation behavior of micro enterprises.Therefore,this thesis focuses on the causal impact of the market reform of industrial land concessions on industrial enterprises’ innovation at the county level.Matching the 2007-2013 Chinese industrial enterprise database with the patent database,we investigate the impact of increased marketization of land concessions on enterprise innovation from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives of industrial enterprises’ innovation.Combining theoretical and empirical analyses,we find that(1)the basic regression finds that the marketization level of industrial land concessions,measured in terms of "number of cases" and "area" respectively,can significantly contribute to the improvement of enterprise innovation in terms of quality and quantity.The above findings still hold after the robustness tests such as extreme value tailoring and replacing the core explanatory variables.(2)Instrumental variables analysis reveals that,in order to mitigate the effects of endogeneity of variables,the underlying regression results still hold under the regression of average slope of county land and the tenure of municipal party secretaries of prefecture-level cities as instrumental variables.(3)The mechanism analysis finds that marketization of industrial land concessions can promote enterprise innovation by increasing the number of private and foreignowned enterprises in the county,reducing the cost of external financing for enterprises,and increasing the per capita asset allocation of enterprises in three ways,and the number and area of industrial land concessions measured by "number of cases" and "area",respectively.(4)The heterogeneity analysis found that the marketization level of industrial land disposal,as measured by "number of cases" and "area" respectively,remained significant.The heterogeneity analysis found that counties were divided into high level and low level groups using the variables of land ownership per capita,county GDP level,and total industrial output value of the county as indicators.In the high level group,the improvement of the marketization of industrial land can promote the quality and quantity of enterprise innovation,while in the low level group,there is no significant promotion effect.In order to further accelerate the reform of industrial land marketization and boost the innovation ability of enterprises.In the future,we need to:(1)further promote the reform of the fiscal and taxation system and promotion mechanism,alleviate the "fiscal mismatch" and the pressure of promotion of officials at the local level,accelerate the reform of the local fiscal and taxation system,adjust the original performance assessment system,and fundamentally eliminate the inherent incentives for local governments to use non-market-based approaches to industrial land concessions.(2)Optimize the business system for enterprises,encourage their innovative development,and continuously play the role of market-based land grant methods in the allocation of land resources,and enhance the fairness,impartiality and openness of the land grant process.(3)Actively guide the rational allocation of enterprise resources to avoid a large mismatch of innovation resources while preventing possible land financial risks.