Research On Supply Chain Coordination Of Two-stage Influenza Vaccine Under Yield Uncertainty

Clinical research shows that influenza vaccination is one of the most effective ways to prevent influenza pandemic.In China,influenza vaccine is a non-immunization program vaccine,and people voluntarily vaccinate at their own expense.At present,the annual influenza vaccination rate is maintained at a low level,resulting in a huge total social cost of influenza prevention and control.In addition,because the validity period of vaccines is generally only one year,and excess stocks can only be scrapped,the vaccine manufacturer generally adopts a relatively conservative production strategy and is unwilling to produce in large quantities.In addition,due to the particularity of influenza vaccine production,it has the characteristics of uncertain yield.In order to optimize the yield and coverage of influenza vaccine,this thesis studies the coordination of influenza vaccine supply chain composed of a single vaccine manufacturer and the government under the condition of uncertain yield.Considering the uncertainty of vaccine yield,this paper establishes a two-stage production model that allows the vaccine manufacturer to carry out emergency production when conventional production does not meet the demand.Secondly,the optimal production and ordering decisions of influenza vaccine supply chain members in decentralized decision-making model and centralized decision-making model are solved,and the optimal decisions of supply chain members in the two cases are compared.The results show that the ratio of planned influenza vaccine production to influenza vaccine demand in decentralized decision-making situation is smaller than that in centralized decision-making situation;When decentralized decision-making,members of vaccine supply chain make decisions with the goal of maximizing their own interests,which leads to the decrease of supply chain efficiency.By introducing the combination contract of “out-of-stock punishment-price adjustment-production subsidy”,we prove that this contract can coordinate the influenza vaccine supply chain under certain conditions.The conclusions of this thesis are as follows:(1)When the yield is uncertain,the combination contract of “out-of-stock punishment-price adjustment-production subsidy” can coordinate the supply chain of influenza vaccine and optimize the yield and coverage of influenza vaccine through out-of-stock punishment,redefining the vaccine price in the emergency production stage and giving vaccine manufacturers production subsidies according to the actual yield.(2)Both the government and the vaccine manufacturer can benefit from appropriately increasing the penalty cost of shortage.(3)The coordinated vaccine supply chain not only improves the planned production of the vaccine manufacturer,but also reduces the intensity of non-pharmaceutical intervention by the government,which is conducive to controlling the influenza epidemic.