| Under the basic economic system of China with the public sector remaining dominant and diverse sectors of the economy developing side by side,state-owned enterprises play a leading role in the process of economic development in China,and the reform of state-owned enterprises has always been the core of economic system reform in China.At present,the focus of the reform of state-owned enterprises is to develop the mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,aiming at comprehensively enhancing the competitiveness and anti-risk ability of state-owned economy.The mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises takes the introduction of non-state capital as the basic method,and improves the management and governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises through the participation of non-state shareholders in governance,including the investment and financing decision-making level of state-owned enterprises.However,in the financial system dominated by banks,the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of Chinese enterprises has always been the main source of financial risk,and even can weaken the competitiveness of enterprises in serious cases.Therefore,it is of great significance to explore the influence of non-state shareholders’ participation in corporate governance on the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of state-owned enterprises.This paper selects non-financial state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2013 to 2019 as samples.From the perspective of maturity mismatch of investment and financing,this paper manually collects the data of the top ten non-state shareholders’ shareholding ratio and appointed directors,supervisors and senior managers disclosed in the annual reports of state-controlled listed companies.From the two dimensions of ownership structure and senior management,This paper investigates the influence of non-state shareholders’ participation in governance on the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of state-owned enterprises,analyzes the intermediary role of agency cost and excessive debt,and further discusses the influence of administrative level of state-owned enterprises,the level of competition in the industry and the level of monetary policy.The findings of this paper are as follows :(1)the participation of non-state shareholders in governance inhibits the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of state-owned enterprises,and is significantly effective in ownership structure and senior management.(2)The restraining effect of non-state shareholders on the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of state-owned enterprises is significant in local state-owned enterprises,competitive state-owned enterprises and the period of loose monetary policy.(3)The mechanism test shows that non-state shareholders’ participation in governance mainly restrains the maturity mismatch of investment and financing of state-owned enterprises through two channels: agency cost and excessive debt.(4)The study of economic consequences shows that the participation of non-state shareholders in governance has a positive impact on the operating performance of state-owned enterprises,and the maturity mismatch of investment and financing plays a mediating role in the relationship between the participation of non-state shareholders in governance and the operating performance of state-owned enterprises.On the one hand,this study supports the effectiveness of the policies of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of maturity mismatch of investment and financing.On the other hand,it also provides practical reference for the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises to optimize the maturity of investment and financing matching behavior to improve the ability to resist risks. |
