Research On Innovation Of Financing Guarantee Mechanism For High-tech Small And Medium-sized Enterprises

High-tech small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)are the leading force of independent innovation in science and technology,and the transformation of achievements and industrialization.They play an important role in realizing the goal of "maintaining growth and stabilizing employment".Because of the weak support of the capital market and the inability of private guarantee institutions to change the financing guarantee predicament of high-tech SMEs,it is necessary and urgent to discuss how the government,governmental financing guarantee institutions and commercial banks can form a joint force to effectively solve the related difficulties.We take the mechanism design theory as a guidance and information efficiency,incentive compatibility as a core.On the one hand,we analyze the inherent defects of the current financing guarantee mechanism of high-tech SMEs.On the other hand,we discuss the feasibility and reasonable ways of government support for financing guarantee of high-tech SMEs,in order to innovate the financing guarantee mechanism of high-tech SMEs.The specific research ideas of this thesis are as follows.Firstly,the basic concepts are explained.Literature research is adopted to understand the research status at home and abroad,and mechanism design theory is used to lay the theoretical foundation of this thesis.We establish the evaluation standard of financing guarantee mechanism for SMEs.Secondly,we analyze the financing situation of high-tech SMEs in provinces and cities according to the actual situation,and compare the government financing guarantee institutions with private financing guarantee institutions.Thirdly,according to the general mode of loan guarantee for high-tech SMEs,a three-party non-cooperative evolutionary game model including high-tech SMEs,commercial banks and government financing guarantee institutions is constructed,aiming at depicting the internal relations among various components or structures in the financing system and the defects of the existing financing guarantee mechanism.On this basis,governments at all levels are added to construct the four-party non-cooperation evolutionary game model.We try to find the optimal equilibrium strategy from the theoretical level,and probe into the innovative mechanism of financing guarantee for high-tech SMEs supported by the government.Finally,numerical simulation is carried out to verify the rationality of the game model based on the actual situation.According to the research conclusions,innovative suggestions are put forward to improve the financing guarantee environment of high-tech SMEs.The main research conclusions of this thesis are:(1)Compared with private guarantee institutions,government financing guarantee institutions cannot resolve the financing guarantee dilemma without government intervention.(2)After government intervention,it is theoretically feasible for the government financing guarantee institutions and commercial banks to cooperate benignly and finally resolve the predicament through effective mechanism design.(3)When the government believes that the benefits of adopting a subsidy policy are greater than the costs,it will choose to intervene.There are 9 policy combinations that match 4 types of single policies to choose from.(4)All individual policies in the policy portfolio must achieve the predetermined expected effect in order to play a synergistic role to resolve the predicament,otherwise it will be ineffective.The above conclusions are fully verified by numerical simulation methods.Finally,some feasible policy recommendations are put forward.