Supply Chain Competition Model Considering Sales Effort Under Asymmetric Demand Information

With the improvement of social productivity,the substitutability of products is gradually increasing,and the speed of upgrading is also gradually accelerating.In order to attract more consumers,members of the supply chain(SC)will choose to invest various forms of sales effort to stimulate market demand.In addition,because enterprises are relatively independent in the operation process and the business content is different,information asymmetry exists in all walks of life,and generally occurs in the operation process of the SC.Based on the above background,the thesis constructs a two-echelon SC composed of one supplier(he)and one retailer(she),in which the supplier has private demand information.This thesis establishes two models of retailer’s input into sales effort and supplier’s input into sales effort,constructs information screening model based on twopart pricing contract,and studies the optimal contract scheme to realize supplier demand information sharing.By comparing the optimal decision and optimal profit under the demand information asymmetry and demand information asymmetry,the influence of the demand information asymmetry on the SC considering sales effort is studied,and the influence of different sales effort subjects on the SC under the demand information symmetry is further studied.The research shows that in the model of retailer’s investment in sales effort,when the market demand is high,the wholesale price and the level of sales effort in both cases are equal.Under the asymmetric demand information,the supplier can obtain information rent,but the retailer’s profit will be damaged;When the market demand is low,under the asymmetric demand information,the retailer can design a reasonable contract scheme to reduce the supplier’s wholesale price,thus reducing the double marginal effect,and even if the cost of sales effort is high,the retailer will also improve the sales effort,and at this time,the supplier can only obtain retained profit,while when certain condition is established,the retailer can obtain the same profit as when the demand information is symmetric.In the model of supplier’s input into sales effort,when the market demand is high,the situation is the same as that of retailer’s input into sales effort model;When the market demand is low,under the asymmetric demand information,the retailer can also design a reasonable contract scheme to reduce the wholesale price.However,the private demand information of the supplier is not conducive to the improvement of the sales effort,at this time,the supplier can only obtain retained profit,and the asymmetric demand information will certainly cause losses to the retailer.Under the symmetry of demand information,compared with the retailer’s input sales effort model,the supplier will choose a higher wholesale price and sales effort level in the supplier’s input sales effort model.For the retailer,she can always obtain higher profit in the model of supplier’s sales effort.For the supplier,no matter who the main body of sales effort in the SC is,he can only obtain retained profit.