| In order to respond to the changing market and meet the diverse needs of consumers,dual-channel supply chains are widely present in daily life,but the pricing and channel selection issues of dual-channel supply chains have raised multiple concerns due to their complexity,dynamic changes,and difficulty in coordination.In addition,retailers need to forecast market demand based on upstream manufacturers’ product information and downstream consumers’ consumption preferences,and manufacturers may have untrue and single information in the supply chain in order to obtain higher profits,so the market demand forecasted by retailers and the order quantity sent to manufacturers both fluctuate.As a technology that has developed exceptionally prominently in recent years,coalition chain technology makes the supply chain information more transparent and accurate,and the supply chain coordination is higher,which can further improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain.The government has also introduced a series of subsidy policies to show its strong support for blockchain technology.Therefore,in this thesis,using manufacturers as the leaders of the Stackelberg game,we compare and analyze the pricing decisions of supply chain members in three different modes: no adoption of coalition chain,adoption of coalition chain,and adoption of coalition chain with government coalition chain subsidies,considering parameters such as order quantity fluctuation,degree of blockchain usage,and government coalition chain subsidies in the dual channels of online direct sales and online distribution.Among the main research works in this thesis are as follows:First,in the common e-commerce model,the dual channels of online direct sales and online distribution are chosen as the basic channel structure,and parameters such as order quantity fluctuation,degree of blockchain usage,blockchain variation cost,single transaction cost,and government coalition chain technology subsidy are introduced,and six Steinberg game models are established under three different situations of no introduction of coalition chain,introduction of coalition chain,and introduction of coalition chain with government technology subsidy,as follows.Online direct sales dual channel without introducing the coalition chain technology and online distribution dual channel without introducing the coalition chain technology;Online direct sales dual channel with introducing the coalition chain;Online distribution dual channel with introducing the coalition chain;Online direct sales dual channel with introducing the coalition chain with government coalition chain subsidy;Online distribution dual channel with introducing the coalition chain with government coalition chain subsidy.Secondly,after equilibrium solutions are obtained,the pricing and profit impact of order quantity fluctuation,the degree of blockchain usage,and government affiliate chain technology subsidies on dual-channel supply chain members are compared and analyzed to provide a basis for pricing decision and channel selection.Finally,the equilibrium solution is assigned with numerical examples to analyze the impact of order quantity fluctuation and blockchain usage on the pricing and profit of supply chain members,so as to verify the authenticity and reliability of the model results,and to show the decision-making process of each member of the dual-channel supply chain in the form of graphs and charts,so as to provide reference for the pricing decision of each member of the dual-channel supply chain.The main findings of this thesis are as follows.(1)When affiliate chain is not used,the profits of traditional retailers and network distributors in the dual channel of network direct sales and network distribution are the same and decrease with the fluctuation of order quantity;when the inventory cost is within a certain threshold,the manufacturer’s profit decreases with the fluctuation of order quantity.When the order quantity fluctuates within a certain threshold,it is more beneficial for the manufacturer to choose the dual channel of network distribution.(2)When using a federated chain,the profits of manufacturers,traditional retailers,and network distributors rise with order quantity fluctuations if the degree of blockchain use is above a certain threshold.The profit of each member in the dual channel of network distribution is better than the dual channel of direct network sales when the order quantity fluctuates and the combined cost of blockchain is higher.When the adoption of coalition chain has government coalition chain subsidy,manufacturer profits rise with the rise of government coalition chain subsidy,and traditional retailer and network distributor profits are not affected by the subsidy of coalition chain technology.When the degree of blockchain use is within a certain threshold,the online distribution model outperforms the online direct sales model.(3)When comparing and analyzing the pricing and profits of supply chain members under three scenarios: no introduction of coalition chain,introduction of coalition chain,and introduction of coalition chain with government coalition chain subsidy,in the dual channel of online direct sales,if the blockchain change cost is low and satisfies a certain relationship with the unit direct sales cost and market slack,the introduction of coalition chain can increase the profits of each supply chain member.The profits of traditional retailers are equal and higher than those without the introduction of the alliance chain,and the profits of manufacturers are greater than those without the introduction of the alliance chain and less than those with the introduction of the alliance chain and the government’s alliance chain subsidy.In the distribution dual channel,when the government technology subsidy of the coalition chain is higher than a certain threshold and the blockchain variable cost and the market slack satisfy a certain relationship,the profit of each supply chain member is maximum when the coalition chain is introduced with the government coalition chain subsidy. |
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