| In the face of a century of changes intertwined with a century of epidemics,China’s economy is moving forward under continuous pressure in the face of a stormy international environment and the difficult and onerous task of domestic reform,development,and stability.State-owned enterprises,as the mainstay of high-quality economic development,are widely suffering from low innovation efficiency due to social mission and responsibility,technological short-sightedness,and other internal and technical factors.As a latecomer to high-quality economic development,private enterprises generally suffer from low innovation efficiency caused by external,non-self-technical factors such as financing difficulties.To integrate the outstanding advantages of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,offset the inherent defects,and promote the sustainable and high-quality development of China’s economy,The State Council of the People’s Republic of China pointed out in the Guidance on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises that the integration of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises should be encouraged to achieve a win-win situation for both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Based on the above realistic background,many scholars have started to focus on the improvement effect of State-owned Engagement(So E)in various aspects after the implementation of mixed ownership reform,but few scholars have focused on the innovation performance improvement of private enterprises after absorbing investment from state-owned shareholders(“reverse mixed reform”),and there is a lack of research on the related influence mechanism.Further,there is a dearth of analysis on the mechanisms of irrational influence on managers’ emotions.Therefore,this paper will discuss more systematically the impact of state capital involvement on private firms’ innovation performance and introduce managerial sentiment indicators to analyze the possible impact mechanisms.Studying these issues can help provide more effective suggestions for relevant authorities in choosing investments in private enterprises,better promote the implementation of mixed ownership reforms,and better implement innovation-driven development strategies.In this paper,relevant data from non-ST listed companies in the manufacturing industry in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China from 2009 to 2020 are selected as research samples from relevant theories.First,the effects of state capital intervention on innovation performance at the level of patent quantity and innovation performance at the level of patent quality of enterprises,respectively,are discussed in detail.Secondly,the textual analysis method is used to refine managerial sentiment indicators and analyze the moderating effect of managerial sentiment.Further,the robustness of the empirical findings is verified by various methods such as replacement regression models,permutation control variables,and placebo tests.Finally,the consistency of the impact of capital involvement of non-controlling state-owned shareholders and the heterogeneity of the impact of the advanced manufacturing industry and traditional manufacturing industry after state-owned capital involvement are discussed through further research.The findings indicate that(1)state-owned capital intervention can effectively contribute to firms’ innovation performance at both the quantitative and qualitative levels of patents.(2)managerial sentiment can contribute to the level of impact of the state-owned capital intervention on firms’ innovation performance at the quantitative level of patents.And(3)managerial sentiment plays an insignificant role in the impact of the state-owned capital intervention on firms’ innovation performance at the qualitative level of patents.Further research shows that the above findings are widely found in private firms with capital involvement of non-controlling state shareholders.Finally,compared with traditional manufacturing firms,advanced manufacturing firms tend to improve their innovation performance at the quantitative level of patents after receiving the stateowned capital intervention,but slightly lower at the qualitative level of patents. |