Research On The Impact Of Over-appointed Directors By Non-state-owned Shareholders On Innovation Input Of State-owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises are the backbone of the national economy,and improving their innovation ability and promoting their high-quality development have become the focus of the new round of mixed ownership reform.A higher level of mixed ownership reform encourages the deep integration of public and private capital,and state-owned enterprises introduce private capital in order to achieve profound changes in ownership structure and governance mechanism.However,in the real mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,there is a large gap between state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned shareholders.In form,public capital and non-public capital are integrated,but in essence,non-state-owned shareholders are still in a weak position.Under the "one share,one right",their governance function in board decision-making is also limited.Therefore,one of the solutions to the above problems is to change the equal of stock right and control right,and allow non-state-owned shareholders to have more control right by over-appointed directors.This paper will study whether the over-appointed directors by non-state-owned shareholders in the mixed ownership reform has an improving effect on the innovation input of state-owned enterprises,and further analyze the mechanism between the two,so as to provide certain practical guidance for improving the innovation input of state-owned enterprises and provide new ideas for the governance of state-owned enterprises.First of all,this paper introduces the research background and significance,and systematically combs the research status at home and abroad of the over-appointed of directors by non-state-owned shareholders and the innovation input of state-owned enterprises.Secondly,it defines the concepts of mixed ownership enterprises,non-state-owned shareholders’ over-appointed directors and innovation input,and summarizes the relevant theories.Thirdly,the A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2021 are selected as samples,and the multiple regression method is used to test whether the over-appointed directors by non-state-owned shareholders has an impact on the innovation input of state-owned enterprises,and further explore the mechanism of the impact of over-appointed directors on the innovation input.At the same time,it also pays attention to whether the influence varies with the level of the ultimate controller of state-owned enterprises,industry characteristics and institutional environment.The results show that:(1)the over-appointed directors by non-state-owned shareholders can improve the innovation input of state-owned enterprises;(2)Corporate risk-taking and financing constraints play a partial intermediary role between them;(3)The over-appointed directors by non-state-owned shareholders has a more significant effect on the innovation input of state-owned enterprises in local state-owned enterprises,high-tech state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises in highly marketized areas.Finally,according to the research conclusions,suggestions are put forward for improving innovation input of state-owned enterprises,in order to provide new ideas for the governance of state-owned enterprises under the reform.