Study On Ecological Compensation Mechanism Of Watershed Based On The Game Of Stakeholders

The rapid economic development of China has brought huge resources and environmental cost and ecological environmental crisis,especially in the river basin.All the major river basins are facing the problems of water shortage and water environmental pollution.The upstream and downstream areas often cause conflicts of interest due to the exploitation and utilization of water resources,which mainly manifested in the huge contradiction between the right to protection and the right to development in the upstream and downstream regions.Therefore,driven by their respective interests,a typical game characteristic will be formed.The construction of ecological compensation mechanism of Xin’an river basin is actually the result of the game between Anhui province and Zhejiang province.As the first cross-provincial watershed ecological compensation pilot set up at the national level,the state departments concerned and Anhui and Zhejiang provinces have been paying close attention to the water quality of Xin’an River.The main contents of this paper are as follows:Firstly,starting from the basic concept,breaking the topic,three main purposes of this paper are put forward: Who are the watershed stakeholders? What are the problems of watershed ecological compensation? How to realize stable and efficient ecological compensation of watershed? This paper finds that the stakeholders of ecological compensation across the Xin’an river basin includes the central government,local governments on the upper and lower reaches of the basin,and micro-implementation subjects.This paper identifies micro-implementation subjects as the upstream and downstream enterprises for the convenience of research.Secondly,this paper expounds the current situation and problems of ecological compensation in Xin’an river basin,and puts forward some problems.Firstly,the natural geography and economic development of Xin’an river basin are described.Secondly,the status quo of ecological compensation in Xin’an river basin is described from the main content of the two rounds of ecological compensation pilot,and the experience of ecological compensation is summarized.Finally,three major problems existing in ecological compensation of Xin’an river basin are found.Thirdly,Based on the evolutionary game model,this paper analyzes the problem of inter-government.Firstly,the "two-party" game between the upper and lower local governments was analyzed,and it was found that the equilibrium solution could not be obtained.Therefore,the complaint feedback mechanism of the higher government was introduced to analyze the "three-party" game between the central government and the upper and lower local governments,and the two conditions for the equilibrium game solution were obtained.Finally,two conditions of the equilibrium solution of the intergovernmental game were combined with the data from 2015 to 2017 to obtain the satisfied conditions for the application of the complaint mechanism of the superior government in the Xin’an river basin.Fourthly,Based on the complete information static game model,the game between government and enterprise is analyzed.On the one hand,for enterprises,whether to choose the ecological development model is related to the compensation amount of local government.On the other hand,taking the panel data of 11 counties and cities in the Xin’an river basin from 2005 to 2017 as the research object,a dynamic panel model is constructed to study whether the proportion of environmental treatment investment of local governments will affect the total wastewater discharge of industrial enterprises.Finally,the empirical results are analyzed and discussed,and corresponding countermeasures are proposed.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,based on the analysis of the evolutionary game model,the upper and lower local governments cannot achieve the ecological optimal strategy(upstream protection,downstream compensation)only by their own evolution;Join the central government,introduce the second-level government feedback punishment system,through the analysis of the balance of interests of the three,it is found that under the guidance of the central government,the upper and lower local governments can reach the ecological optimal strategy;Secondly,based on the analysis of the static game model of complete information,it is found that for enterprises,whether to choose the ecological development model is related to the compensation amount of local government.The dynamic panel model of 11 counties and cities in Xin’an river basin from 2005 to 2017 shows that the government’s investment in environmental treatment is conducive to reducing the total amount of industrial wastewater discharged by enterprises.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,the corresponding measures of constructing ecological compensation mechanism in Xin’an river basin are proposed.