Research On Ecological Compensation Mechanism Of Watershed Based On Evolutiongary Game

In accordance with the Guidelines on Improving the Compensation Mechanism for Ecological Protection issued by The General Office of the State Council,various forms of compensation for ecological protection have been explored.To further improve the top-level design on the basis of existing policies and practices is an important measure to stabilize the expectation of the main body of ecological protection,which will help promote the construction of ecological civilization to a new stage.In recent years,the adjustment of the economic and industrial structure in the upper reaches of the Luohe River Basin and the rapid development of the surrounding economy have led to the increase of pollution discharge in the upper reaches of the river basin,the increase of pollutant index value,and the pollution pressure of the ecological environment.In order to guarantee the water quality safety of the upper and lower reaches of the Luohe River Basin and further increase the treatment input,governments at all levels and relevant units have reached a consensus.However,the ecological security of the river basin is a long-term task,and institutional guarantee should be improved on how to take into account social development and ecological environment,coordinate the relationship between the upper and lower reaches of water use and the intensity of treatment.In this paper,the Luohe River Basin as the research object,through evolutionary game and ecological compensation quota calculation,to carry out the theoretical research on the construction of ecological compensation mechanism of relevant river basin.Firstly,the current situation and problems of the implementation of ecological compensation in the basin are analyzed.Combined with the actual situation,the two-party and three-party evolutionary game model is constructed and Matlab numerical simulation is carried out.Secondly,the compensation mechanism is constructed based on the conclusion of game analysis.Finally,the compensation limit is calculated according to the constructed model.The results show that although the horizontal payment of local government ecological compensation is effective,the benefit distribution is the main reason that affects its decision-making.After introducing the governance model of tripartite cooperation by the superior government,the game situation is relatively stable.Numerical simulation shows that when the superior government participates in the quota allocation of ecological compensation in the basin,it is easier for the upstream and downstream local governments to reach a full cooperative relationship of upstream protection and downstream compensation.Upstream governments have a stronger incentive to protect the environment when they receive a slightly higher amount of ecological compensation through environmental protection.The calculation method of compensation limit is designed according to the conclusion of evolutionary game.When the water quality reaches the standard,the compensation limit from downstream to upstream is mainly considered.When water quality is not up to standard,compensation from upstream to downstream based on water quality restoration costs is mainly considered.Finally,it is concluded that when the water quality meets the Class II water quality standard and the water supply basically meets the water demand,Henan provincial government and Luoyang Municipal government,the main body of ecological compensation in Luohe River Basin,should compensate230.35 million yuan/year to Sanmenxia City in the upstream of the basin,a total of460.7 million yuan/year.Through game analysis and compensation mechanism design,scientific suggestions are put forward for the construction of long-term ecological compensation mechanism in Luohe River Basin.