Research On The Ecological Compensation Mechanism Of Cross Boundary Watersheds Based On Game Theory

In the practice of watershed ecological governance,the mitigation of negative externality is the fundamental reason for vigorously promoting the construction of watershed ecological compensation mechanism.Due to the inconsistency in social and economic development interests and ecological environmental protection goals between the management entity and the upstream and downstream entities of the watershed in ecological compensation,the three parties have typical game characteristics in ecological compensation practice.To explore the influencing factors of tripartite government participation in watershed ecological compensation and improve the construction of cross-border watershed ecological compensation mechanisms,this article takes the ecological compensation in the Shaanxi Henan section of the Yellow River Basin as an example,and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to obtain the conditions and key elements for the central government,upstream Shaanxi Provincial Government,and downstream Henan Provincial Government to achieve a stable state of collaborative participation in watershed ecological compensation,And the sensitivity of all parties’ decisions to key elements was analyzed through simulation.Establish an evolutionary game model based on effort level on the framework of a tripartite evolutionary game,optimize the punishment intensity,vertical financial transfer,and formulation of ecological compensation funds in the ecological compensation plan for the Shaanxi Henan section of the Yellow River Basin in 2020,and seek the compensation plan that maximizes the effort level of ecological compensation participants in the basin.Explore and pilot the construction of an ecological protection compensation mechanism for the Yellow River Basin through case studies,To promote the governance and protection of the ecological environment in the Yellow River Basin.The main research results and conclusions are as follows:(1)Using the benefit analysis method,it is measured that the Shaanxi Provincial Government will invest 554 million yuan and 122 million yuan respectively in the Yellow River Basin water and soil conservation project and water pollution prevention and control project in 2020,and the generated ecological service value includes the economic benefit and ecological benefit obtained by Shaanxi Province of 646 million yuan,the social benefit of 360 million yuan,the ecological benefit obtained by Henan Province of 207 million yuan,and the development opportunity cost compensation paid by Shaanxi Province of 301 million yuan.(2)Based on evolutionary game theory,establish a tripartite evolutionary game model for the Shaanxi Henan section of the Yellow River Basin,and obtain the constraints and key factors that affect decision-making for the central government,Shaanxi provincial government,and Henan provincial government to jointly manage the basin ecology.The optimal strategy of tripartite collaborative governance in the evolutionary game model is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government to cooperate.When the central government has sufficient regulatory public power,the impact of the initial willingness on the optimal decision can be eliminated.When the central government has weak regulatory public power,the upstream and downstream governments cannot consciously fulfill their ecological compensation obligations.(3)Through simulation analysis of key elements in the evolutionary game model,it is found that sacrificing the opportunity cost of development and vertical financial transfer payment have the most obvious impact on upstream government decision-making;The priority of paying upstream ecological compensation in the two-way regulation of ecological compensation is higher than that of paying downstream ecological compensation in the upstream;The punishment intensity of the central government has an impact on the decision-making of the three parties.The supervision intensity of the central government should ensure the effective supervision of public power and the binding force on lower level governments;The improvement of vertical fiscal transfer incentives and subsidies has a positive impact on the efforts of local governments,but excessive incentives and subsidies will affect regulatory efforts,resulting in less than expected rewards and subsidies.(4)In the 2020 ecological compensation plan for the Shaanxi Henan section of the Yellow River Basin,the two-way ecological compensation funds paid by Shaanxi Province to Henan Province and Henan Province to Shaanxi Province should be set at 206.8 million yuan and 548.6 million yuan respectively;The central government should set a punishment level of 173.72 million yuan for the Shaanxi Provincial Government and 338.2 million yuan for the Henan Provincial Government;The central government should set a vertical fiscal transfer amount of 208 million yuan to the Shaanxi Provincial Government.(5)Establish an ecological compensation game model based on effort level to optimize the calculation method of ecological compensation plan parameters.The central government sets the punishment intensity for the Shaanxi and Henan provincial governments as(-x~2+1)and(-y~2+1),and the central government sets the vertical fiscal transfer reward and compensation intensity for the Shaanxi provincial government as(?).The ecological compensation intensity is determined based on the initial effort level of upstream and downstream governments and the expected plan.(x and y are the efforts of the Shaanxi Provincial Government and the Henan Provincial Government,respectively,x∈[0,1],y∈[0,1])...