Multi-populations Evolutionary Game Research On Utilization Of Industrial Solid Waste In Closed-loop Supply Chain

With the rapid development of the industrial economy,the amount of industrial solid waste is increasing.In order to protect the environment and conserve resources,it is extremely urgent to utilize them.Due to the external positive effect of'the utilization of industrial solid waste and the uncertainty in income,enterprises prefer not to utilize industrial solid waste.Therefore,the government needs to formulate reasonable policies and strengthen supervision of enterprises to resist free-riding behavior of enterprises and ensure enterprises income.However,high regulatory costs sometimes lead to inadequate government policy implementation,and companies no longer utilize industrial solid waste.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the multi-populations evolutionary game research on utilization of industrial solid waste in closed-loop supply chain.In this paper,the two-populations of suppliers and manufacturers are taken as the research object.Firstly,the evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers under the no-government supervision is constructed.Secondly,the evolutionary game between suppliers and manufacturers under the government punishment policy is constructed to boycott the free-riding behavior of enterpri.ses.The model again aims to construct a two-populations evolutionary game model of suppliers and manufacturers under the subsidy policy for the case of small gains from resource utilization,and analyze the evolution rules of each group's strategy selection and the values of different variables.based on the evolutionary state,the simulation analysis i.s carried out to verify the evolution process of the two groups and analyze the influence of the initial values of different groups on the evolution path.Then,with the three-populations of suppliers,manufacturers and government as the research object,in the light of situation of unfavorable strategy combination under the subsidy policy,the evolutionary game model of suppliers,manufacturers and government under the subsidy policy is constructed to study what conditions the government subsidies meet when unfavorable strategy combination is adjusted to favorable strategy combination.On this basis,the simulation analysis is carried out to verify the three-populations evolutionary game process and analyze the influence of the initial value of different populations on the evolution path.Finally,the aluminum product supply chain is taken as the research object,and the relevant cases are analyzecd.The countermeasures are proposed from the three aspects of resisting free-riding behavior of enterprises,improving the profit of utilizing industrial solid waste,and effectively implementing government policies.by analyzing the evolutionary game model between supplier and manufacturer under government supervision,this paper finds that whether supplier and manufacturer choose the strategy of utilizing industrial solid waste or not is closely related to the input-income ratio of both sides.When the input-income ratio of both sides changes constantly,there arc many kinds of evolutionary stable equilibrium;by analyzing the supplier and manufacturer under the punishment policy of the government,we find that only when the government fines are greater than the difference between the free-rider profits of suppliers and manufacturers and the profits from the simultaneous choice of resource-based utilization can suppliers and manufacturers be effectiv,ely encouraged to choose resource-based utilization,by analyzing the evolutionary game model of suppliers and manufacturers under the government subsidy policy,we find that only when the subsidy is larger than suppliers and manufacturer,Only when the difference between the free-rider's profit and the profit from the resource-based utilization is chosen by the manufacturer can the supplier and the manufacturer choose the resource-based utilization effectively.The above results are simulated and analyzed.It is found that the final evolutionary stable state will not be affected but the time when the other party reaches the evolutionary stable state will be affected by the initial value of one party.The supplier under the subsidy policy is analyzed.The threes-group evolutionary game model of manufacturer and government finds that the government subsidy is larger than the difference between the benefit of free-rider from supplier and the benefit of resource-based utilization strategy from both sides.Only when the higher authorities give the maximum value of the difference between the subsidy from government and the cost of supervision and management of enterprises,can the government effectively implement the supervision policy and encourage enterprises.Industry chooses the strategy of resource utilization.In view of the frequent environmental pollution incidents caused by industrial solid waste,this paper considers that consumers with green consumption preferences are willing to buy green industrial products at higher prices.This paper analyses and compares the dynamic evolution priocess of multi-populations strategy selection for utilization of industrial solid waste with no government supervision and government supervision,so as to formulate laws and regulations for the government to promote the utilization of industrial solid waste.