Evolutionary Game Study On Construction Waste Resource Utilization Based On System Dynamics

With the promotion of new urbanization and new infrastructure strategy,China’s urbanization has entered a new stage of improving quality and efficiency.The large amount of construction waste brought by urban renewal construction has caused huge environmental pressure,and the reasonable treatment and utilization of construction waste is an important practical problem that needs to be solved urgently.Resourceful treatment of construction waste is the ideal way to reduce carbon emissions in the construction industry and achieve green and sustainable development.However,the resource utilization of construction waste in China started late and faces problems such as large accumulation of construction waste,low level of recycling,and lack of relevant laws,regulations,and standard policies,so it is of certain practical significance to study the resource utilization of construction waste.Firstly,this paper uses the literature review method to identify 12 factors affecting the development of construction waste resource utilization and extracts 4 key influencing factors of enterprise cost,policy and regulation,initiative of interest subjects,and cognitive level of interest subjects through a questionnaire survey and factor analysis method.Next,the game subjects are defined,and the interest demands of the game subjects and the mechanism of multi-subject driving of construction waste resource utilization are analyzed.On the basis of the above,the evolutionary game theory is applied to construct the government-contractorpublic tripartite evolutionary game models under static and dynamic subsidies respectively,and analyze the stabilization strategies of finite rational interest players in the evolutionary game system.The rational stabilization strategies of interest players in the evolutionary game system are analyzed.Then the system dynamics model is drawn according to the mathematical relationships provided by the three-party evolutionary game model,and the evolutionary paths of the static subsidy and dynamic subsidy systems are simulated and analyzed respectively with the help of Vensim software,and the effects of the government regulation intensity,penalty intensity,incremental revenue of contractors when the public participates in supervision and the financial subsidy intensity on the probability of contractors adopting construction waste resource utilization are focused on.The results show that when the government adopts medium-intensity regulation and high-intensity punishment,the contractors will increase the probability of adopting the construction waste resource utilization strategy;public participation and supervision can accelerate the contractors’ tendency to adopt the construction waste resource utilization strategy;the incentive effect of government financial subsidies has a marginal decreasing effect,and blindly increasing the financial subsidies is not conducive to the stability of the game system.Finally,based on the results of the study,we propose countermeasures and suggestions from three aspects,namely,the government’s incentive to supervise,the contractors’ resource utilization of construction waste,and the public’s active participation in supervision.By constructing an evolutionary game model and a system dynamics model,this paper studies the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the government,contractors,and the public in the resource utilization of construction waste,and explores the influence of key parameters on the resource utilization of construction waste.The research results are beneficial to the implementation of government incentive policies,promote the participation of contractors and the public in the resource utilization of construction waste,and promote the sustainable and stable development of the resource utilization of construction waste.