Research On Government-enterprise Cooperation Supervision Evolution Strategy Of Waste Clean-up Considering Sustainability And Infection Probability Under Major Infectious Disease Pandemics

In recent years,China has suffered a number of major infectious disease pandemics,which seriously threatened the safety of people’s lives and property.In order to effectively respond to major infectious disease pandemics,a large number of emergency supplies were transported to the affected areas urgently,but a large amount of virus-carrying disaster waste generated by the use of these emergency supplies was also inevitable.If they couldn’t be cleaned up in time,it would increase the risk of virus transmission and further increase the difficulty of prevention and control of major infectious disease pandemics.Based on this,this paper followed the concept of sustainable development,abstracted and identified the main stakeholders in the waste clean-up business under major infectious disease pandemics,as well as deeply analyzed the influencing factors of each stakeholder in strategy selection,and studied the regulatory issues of governmententerprise cooperation without considering public participation and considering public participation,respectively.Firstly,in the context of frequent major infectious disease pandemics,this paper abstracted and identified the main stakeholders and influencing factors in waste clean-up under major infectious disease pandemics,analyzed the game relationship between different players,and clarified the relationship between government-enterprise cooperation in waste clean-up under major infectious disease pandemics.The game relationship was analyzed between game players,and the connotation of governmententerprise cooperation supervision in the waste clean-up business under major infectious disease pandemics was clarified.Secondly,an evolutionary game model of the government-enterprise cooperation supervision of waste clean-up under major infectious disease pandemics was constructed,and the stability of the model was analyzed by Friedman’s method,and Wuhan was taken as an example for simulation analysis The results showed that: at the early stage of major infectious disease pandemics,the attention to disaster waste clean-up was low and opportunistic behavior was obvious;at the peak of major infectious disease pandemics,the business volume of disaster waste clean-up was high,the opportunistic behavior of logistics service providers was weakened and they would take the initiative to provide compliance services;at the late stage of major infectious disease pandemics,the business of disaster waste clean-up was mature and the business volume was weakened,which required strengthen government regulation.Finally,a game model for the evolution of government-enterprise cooperation supervision of waste clean-up under major infectious disease pandemics considering public participation was constructed;Lyapunov’s first law was used to analyze the stability of the model;and Wuhan city was used as an example for simulation.The results show that under the scenario of considering public participation,the tendency of both logistics service providers to provide non-compliant services and lax regulation by local governments gradually slowed down with the increase of public perceived satisfaction,which had a dampening effect on the opportunistic behavior of logistics service providers and the inaction of local governments.