The Study On Chinese Safety Producting Regulating System's Operation From The Perspective Of Game

After the reform and opening, the Chinese economy has got rapid development, but safety producting problems have already become the important restricting factors to economy's development. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of China attaches great importance to the problem of the enterprises' safety producting. In order to solve the problems better which safety producting problem our nation faced, our country's safety producting regulating system undergoes several changes, eventually form the safety producting regulating system as follows: "state monitoring, local regulating, enterprise responsible", but now the system's operation effect is not very ideal. The reason which causes this condition is as follows: the interests goals of three subjects which are involved in the safety producting regulating system are not consistent, the three subjects game each other for their respective benefits, it is unavoidable make negative influences to the government regulating effect. Only analyze the three subjects'relationship under the premise that the interests of the three subjects is not consistent, look for the methods and ways which could make the current safety producting regulating system effective operation, we could bring the current safety producting regulating system into full play in the enterprises'safety producting security role, greatly reduce the industrial accident rate, promote the social economy's healthy and orderly development.Under this background, this paper is concentrated on "The Study on the Chinese Safety Producting Regulating System's Operation from the Perspective of Game". In this paper, first, summarize the other scholars'research results, and based on this, launched the article's research. The article's research contents can be divided into three sections:The first part is the chapter 3. Firstly, introduce the Chinese safety producting regulating system; secondly, introduce the safety producting regulating system of the United States, Britain, Japan; finally, study the reference which the safety producting regulating system construction experience the America, Britain, Japan give to our country. The first part provides a necessity support to the below research.The second part is chapter 4～7. Mainly analyses the three subjects'relationship of the game.Chapter 4 is aimed at the reality "at present, the mainstream of our country's safety producting regulating practice is good, but there also have some corruption phenomenon", distinguish two kinds of circumstance——the circumstance under the condition of corruption and normal circumstance, analyse the local government's regulating mechanism under the condition of complete information.In chapter 5, firstly, use the principal-agent theory to analyze the possibility and effectiveness of contract incentive mechanism which is established by the local government and enterprises under the condition of incomplete information; secondly, use the signal theory establish signal game model to analyze the approach of solving the problem of enterprises'adverse selection. In chapter 6, firstly, analyze the relationship of the central government and local government in the safety producting regulating system; secondly, construct the game model under the condition of the complete information to analyze the validity problem of the central government's surveillance mechanism which is under the condition of complete information; Finally, use the principal-agent theory analyse contracts incentive mechanism design problem which aim at local government under the condition of incomplete information.In chapter 7, use evolutionary economics theory analyse the problem of the central government monitoring measures' indirect impact which is put on enterprise's behavior under the condition of incomplete information. The central government's monitoring measures which is discussed and analysed in the chapter 7 only include measures of reward and punishment.The third part is the chapter 8. On the basis of the second part's research, the third part expounds the countermeasures of improving Chinese safety producting regulating system's operation effect.The chapter 9 is the research conclusion and prospect. Firstly, summarizes the above research; secondly, point out the insufficiency; finally, give the prospect for the future research direction.The paper mainly innovate in the following aspects:(1) use game method demonstrates the influence of safety producting investment's profit which aim at the enterprise's strategy choice in the course of the game which have infinite times; (2) combining with the principal-agent theory, use game method to establish the contract incentive model under the condition of existing the conceal; (3) establish a signal game-theory to analyse adverse selection problem which may appear in the course of safety producting regulating; (4) use the evolutionary game method to study the indirect impact of the central government's measures of reward and punishment on enterprise's behavior.