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Research On High-speed Railway Operation Safety Management Maturity And Supervision Evolutionary Game Model

Posted on:2020-10-27Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:K H LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1481306473470694Subject:Traffic Information Engineering & Control
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With the rapid development of high-speed railway(HSR),China has now become the country with the largest constructing and operating mileage of HSR in the world,greatly improving the quality of people's travel and making important contributions to national economic construction in China.Since the HSR is the result of the leap-forward development of China's railway in recent years,the management system is also in the stage of exploration.The safety management of HSR and passenger transport line has both the characteristics of the past and the new situations or problems that have never existed before.Therefore,HSR safety management and supervision have become increasingly important.In order to standardize and strengthen railway safety supervision and management,the State Council(SC),the State Railway Administration(SRA)and China Railway Corporation(CRC)have issued a series of legal provisions related to railway safety management and supervision.On the basis of this,the relevant units further introduced,refined and improved specific measures,laying a foundation for the initial establishment of the HSR operation safety management system.After China's HSR is put into operation,it often adopts the entrusted transportation management mode(ETMM)to carry out production and operation.In HSR operation safety supervision system,there is a complicated game relationship among the safety supervision of the SRA,the safety supervision and inspection of the HSR company and the safety production of the entrusted railway bureau(RB).Clearing the relationship among various stakeholders in the system and studying the optimized safety supervision mechanism are of great practical significance for improving the safety management level of HSR and ensuring the safety of HSR operations.This paper addresses the problems in the complex operational safety management and supervision system of HSR.To deepen the understanding of the safety management laws of HSR operations and to effectively prevent HSR operation safety accidents,The following research is carried out on the safety management and supervision system of HSR operations:1.For the evaluation of the safety management level of HSR operation enterprises,the paper constructs a proposal model for the maturity evaluation system of the HSR operation safety management system.The model includes two dimensions of attributes and levels.It can make a comprehensive and clear representation of each point and element in the HSR safety risk management system,and help to evaluate the level of safety management of HSR operations objectively;Based on the proposed model,a method for quantitative calculation of safety management maturity using grey comprehensive evaluation method is proposed.It can avoid the limitations of single evaluation method,and evaluate the safety management level of HSR operations comprehensively,systematically and intuitively.The model and evaluation method are convenient for the railway enterprises to compare the maturity level of themselves with the whole industry or other similar enterprises.It is helpful for enterprises to develop appropriate strategies to improve safety management maturity and achieve objective evaluation and supervision,so as to improve the safety risk management level of HSR.2.According to the characteristics of the HSR safety supervision and management system in China,based on evolutionary game theory,the dynamic game phenomenon existing in the operation safety supervision system of HSR is analyzed and studied in this paper.The system evolution game model of SRA,HSR company and entrusted RB is proposed from the macroscopic view and puts forward the multi-agent supervision evolutionary game model of HSR company and its three entrusting RBs from the point of view of inside CRC.On this basis,through evolutionary game theory derivation and mathematical proof,the equilibrium points of the system evolution game of the above two models are solved.It also analyzes whether the complex game model has evolutionary stable strategy among the stakeholders and obtains the stable state of decision-making of all parties in the system game.3.For the HSR operation safety supervision system,the parties in the evolutionary game show dynamic and complex features such as long-term,periodic and multiple feedback.Based on the system dynamics theory,this paper analyzes and decomposes the complex system model structure,and establishes the system dynamics model of the HSR safety supervision system evolution game and the multi-agent supervision and evolution game.The feedback structure and behavior of game evolution in HSR operation safety supervision system are studied.The evolutionary game theory is combined with system dynamics simulation to analyze whether these two kinds of complex game models have evolutionarily stable strategies in the long-term dynamic game process of various stakeholders.The stability of the equilibrium points of the system evolution game of these two models are verified by system dynamics simulation.4.In order to make the multi-party games that include the SRA,HSR company,entrusted RB to achieve the optimal control state.This paper aims at the reward and punishment system(incentive and restraint mechanism)of HSR operation safety supervision system in China.Based on the system static evolution game model and by optimizing it gradually,Three models are put forward,include dynamic reward model,dynamic reward and punishment model,optimized dynamic reward and punishment model.By optimizing the static evolutionary game model of multi-agent supervision,the dynamic evolutionary game model is proposed.Through the combination of evolutionary game theory and system dynamics simulation,the above two models are optimized and analyzed,so that all parties in the system reach an ideal equilibrium state in the long-term game process,Thus,under the model of ETMM in China's HSR,Suggestions are put forward for improvement of the defects in the operation safety supervision system of HSR,and experience reference are provided for improving the effect of operation safety supervision and the design and application of the supervision mechanism,so as to further improve the ETMM of HSR.
Keywords/Search Tags:high-speed railway, operational safety management, operational safety supervision, maturity, evolutionary game, system dynamics
PDF Full Text Request
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