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Coodination Strategies In Intermodal Freight Virtual Enterprise Logistics Supply Chain

Posted on:2014-05-23Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:J LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330434961055Subject:Traffic Information Engineering & Control
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the advance in science, the boundaries of human business are being pushed furtherout. The expected grand expenditures devoted to international logistics service. Over the pastdecades, more and more firms consider to utilize intermodalism to decrease logistics costssubstantially. Intermodal freight transport can be defined as the movement of goods in oneand the same loading unit or vehicle by successive modes of transport without handling of thegoods themselves when hanging modes. Its goal is to provide an integration and effectiveseamless door-to-door service to reduce logistics costs. There are always more than twoseparate firms involved in one intermodal freight transport service, therefore, during thewhole operation process, the decentralized decision system from the multi-actor’sparticipation is an outstanding feature. In a decentralized intermodal logistics supply chain,lots of disorder behaviors caused by the conflict for the inherent contradiction between theindividual rationality and collective rationality would impede the development ofintermodalism. Hence, the coordination or cooperation among the multi-actor is a coreproblem.In this Ph.D. dissertation, we tempt to analysis the separate firms’ behaviors in theintermodal freight logistics supply chain. Virtual corporations are the necessary trend ofcorporation organization’s evolution; virtual enterprise has been gradually evolved into a newtype of enterprise’s organizational structure. Under the constraint of fast changingcircumstance, the operation of intermodalism tends to have the features of virtual enterprise.In general, there are two different basic relationships, i.e. vertical and horizontal. On the basisof two relationships, from virtual enterprise viewpoint, the research studies the operationmechanism in intermodal logistics supply chain. Designing coordination schemes tocollaborate the behaviors from such as shipper and segment carrier, forwarder and carrier,carrier alliance, ect. In this dissertation, we quantitative exploit the coordinating mechanism,and some interdisciplinary researches are done. Our principal contribution is to use principlesfrom not only game theory (non-cooperate game, cooperative game) and optimization theorybut also microeconomics and organizational behavior theory to analysis the game strategiesand designing the coordinating mechanism. The main content includes:1. Coopetition investment-price game theoretic model in intermodal freight transport.In this section, we study the vertical behavior in the intermodal logistics supply chain.The study focus on the coordination behavior analysis of the downstream different carriers inthe intermodal freight transport, a making-decision problem on cooperation and competitionbetween the two oligopoly transportation firms which provide complementary transportservice is considered. Based on the game theory, a two stage dynamic game model with complete information on cooperation investment and price strategies is formulated. Usingbackward induction approach to solve the problem, according to the theoretical analysis, theresearch shows: there is not complete cooperation or complete conflict between the separatefirms. The equilibrium presents a peculiar mixture of cooperation and conflict, i.e. coopetitionrelationship.The paper further focus on how to improve the equilibrium. The final equilibrium wouldbe improved apparently by repeat price game strategic with appropriate allocation mechanism.When adopt finite price repeat game, if the repeats are even numbers, the sequence to choosestrategic by separate firms will not affect their final respective profit. Otherwise, the sequenceand the first strategy will affect their final profit. When adopt infinite price repeat game, wedesign the suitable trigger Strategy. The players finally achieve Pareto efficiency for theincentive by trigger Strategy.2. Collaborative game analysis through penalty scheme in the freight intermodal service.In this section, we study coordination mechanisms through penalty schemes betweenforwarder and carrier which cooperation together to make transport capacity distribute plan inthe intermodal freight transport net. We assume, in a duopoly freight transport market, thereare two separate transport firms with complementary transport model cooperation to developa long haul intermodal freight service. Firm I is the first segment carrier and firm II is thesecond segment carrier. Two possible organizational structures in intermodal, i.e. centralizedand decentralized are taken into consideration. In the centralized case—the first best case as abenchmark, wherein two firms jointly decide on the transport capacity distribute plan. In thedecentralized case, a Stackelberg game model is formulated. Based on the different coststructure and given service level constraint for carrier I, carrier I has overestimate incentiveand carrier II has undersupply incentive on transport capacity distribute decision making. Inorder to coordinate the decision, a penalty scheme is designed to coordinate two firm’sbehavior necessarily.We first analyze two firm’s behavior strategic under the influence of penalty scheme inthe decentralized system. Firm I is the Stackelberg leader with the constraint service level andfirm II is the follower. The solution equilibrium strategic shows it is never optimal for firm IIto make more than the demand estimate specified by firm I, and the given service level isessential for setting correcting penalty scheme to coordination. When the higher service levelis given, the penalties mainly focus on the behavior of under supply by firm II. When thelower service level is given, then the essence of penalties is the control to firm I.Second, we analyze the centralized system—the first best case and as a benchmark,wherein two firms maximize their joint profit with the constraint of service level. This studyshow that by setting the suitable penalties one can generate the same result in a decentralized system as that obtained from a centralized system. It also discussed in details the effectiverange of penalties to coordinate two firm’s decision. In the end, a numerical example isprovided to verify the validity of conclusions, and then some concluding remarks arepresented finally.3. Study on horizontal cooperation and lateral cooperation in intermodal logistics supplychain.In this section, the dissertation focus on horizontal cooperation and lateral cooperation inintermodal logistics supply chain. Considering two different alliances, i.e. independentforwarders to coordinate their delivery frequency excluding or including carrier. We addressthe problems on forming alliance in order to save delivery costs. This research is to useprinciples from cooperative game theory to identify the most profitable alliances and todetermine the portion of profit that would be allocated to each actor in order to guarantee thestability of the formed alliances.We first study the independent forwarders coordinate by joint shipment to save deliverycosts. Considering two part nonlinear tariff and the shipping frequently as decision variable,the carriers’ alliance profit share game is defined from a game-theoretic viewpoint. Thefurther research shows the profit share game is convex game, and there are exists a non-emptycore. Therefore, Shapley value is a core-allocation.Second, based on the forwarder alliance, we tempt to design an appropriate profitallocation scheme to forming a big alliance include carrier. That is virtually a lateralcollaboration problem. There are two types of important transportation costs, i.e., fixed costand variable cost are considered, and then define the big alliance profit share game. Thesufficient conditions which the game to meet the super additivity are discussed, meanwhile,there are a non-empty core exists.Subsequently, the portion of profit that would be allocated to each actor in order toguarantee the stability of the formed alliances is studied. We first consider a core allocationand as initial allocation, this allocation will be called the altruistic allocation since it is theworst possible core-allocation for the carrier, namely the only one in which he receivesnothing, all profits are take by all forwarders. It is obviously not fair because it assigns a zeropayoff to the carrier although this company is needed to obtain the largest total profits. Andthen, a suitable solution for big alliance games should assign a positive payoff to the carrierand it should belong to the core of the game. The rule has the same flavor as the Shapleyvalue, but requires less computational effort.
Keywords/Search Tags:Intermodalism, Virtual enterprise service chain, Non-cooperative game, Coopetition, Cooperative game, Alliance
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