Study On Cooperative Game Decision Of S Manufacturer Under Multi-channel Supply Chain

In order to excavate the potential demand of the market,expand the market share and enhance brand influence under the Internet environment,more and more manufacturers and retailers have opened up multi-channel supply chain models that coexist with multiple channels of online and offline.Facing the same target market,channel conflicts caused by the market share competition and price competition will inevitably occur among the channel members.Violent channel conflicts will damage the stability of the supply chain system and the interests of supply chain members.Therefore,to provide what kind of service level to alleviate channel conflicts have become a common concern in academia and industry.S Manufacturer has established a multi-channel supply chain model,including online direct sales channel,online distribution channel and traditional retail channel.In the development of multi-channel supply chain,various of channel management problems have gradually emerged,such as channel conflicts,difficulties on channel integration and weak ability to expand channels and so on.Therefore,this thesis firstly analyzes the current channel characteristics based on the actual channel development status of S Manufacturer,and analyzes the causes of the channel management problems of the enterprise.On this basis,this thesis considers the construction method of linear demand model based on elasticity theory,and combines the cooperative game theory and the idea of supply chain strategic alliance.To construct the Stackelberg game model under the non-cooperative decision of each channel member,and partial cooperative game model based on the strategic cooperative alliance between S Manufacturer and L Online Distributor.And then compares and analyzes the impact of the service level and channel cross-price elasticity coefficient on the pricing and profit of the channel members.Finds that the channel pricing is positively correlated with service level and also positively correlated with consumer experience service sensitivity coefficient.And with the numerical analysis method,it is found that with the increasing of channel cross-price elasticity coefficient,the system profits will increase to optimal level when the traditional retailer and the supply chain alliance provide optimal service level under the partial cooperation decision making by the manufacturer,and the optimal value is better than the value under non-cooperation.The manufacturer can mitigate channel conflicts and build profit levels for each channel member by constructing a cooperative game alliance with online distributor.Secondly,the Shapley value method is applied to allocate the profit of the cooperative game alliance composed of manufacturer and online distributor,and then analyzes the stability of the profit allocation.And conducts a comparative analysis of the profit of each channel member under the partial cooperation decision and the profit of each channel member under the non-cooperative decentralized decision.Finds that when the alliance provides some higher service levels or high service levels,the profit allocation mechanism designed by the manufacturer and the online distributor based on the Shapley value method can ensure the stability of the cooperative game alliances.Finally,based on the study results,this thesis puts forward relevant suggestions for S Manufacturer in the channel management strategy,and believes that S Manufacturer can effectively mitigate channel conflicts by constructing cooperative game alliance with online distributor based on the joint construction of the offline brand experience stores.