Font Size: a A A

Research On The Property Rights And Governanc Structure Of State-owned Commercial Bank

Posted on:2015-07-21Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:H B XingFull Text:PDF
GTID:1109330452471459Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
As the core of the modern market economy,the safety and sustainabledevelopment of financial system have a very important impact on the nationaleconomic security and social stability,which is the true meaning of financial security.Given the importance of financial system in the national economic security and theserious threat of serious threat,China has decided to reform the financial system.Asthe most important part of China financial system,state-owned commercial banks willundoubtedly become the key part.Since the establishment of four major state-ownedcommercial banks,they have made a great contribution to economic development andeconomic stability.However,due to historical and practical reasons,there are still someproblems in the property right and governance structure of four major state-ownedcommercial banks.If they don’t put the structure and mechanism innovation intopractice,the stability of financial system and national economic security will faceserious threat.Therefore,it is necessary to study these problems and put the propertyright and governance structure innovation into practice,which will safeguard thestability of financial system and national economic security effectively.This paper takes the problems of property right and governance structurereforms of state-owned commercial banks as the entry point,and takes Marxist theoryof property right and Marxist firm theory as the guide.Then,on the foundation ofcriticizing and learning western theory of property rights and corporate governancetheory,this paper focuses on state-owned shares,non-state-owned shares,internalgovernance structure and comprehensive performance evaluation standards aboutproperty right and governance structure of state-owned commercial banks,analyzesthe causes of ownership and governance structure of the existing problems and putsforward the basic ideas of solving problem. During the research,a variety of researchmethods are applied to the paper,including Marxism history and logicmethod,normative analysis and empirical analysis combined method,inductiveanalysis method and inductive analysis method.The research thought of this paper is as follows:Putting forward problem--Analyzing problem--Solving problem.Thispaper has mainly achieved the following research results:This paper takes the reform of state-owned commercial bank equitydiversification as research object,puts forward the idea that state-owned commercialbank must guarantee absolute holding state.The key of equity diversification is howto determine the best way of holding and the proportion of state shares on the premiseof national absolute holding.In this way,it can guarantee national absolute holding andfully arouse the enthusiasm of non-state-owned shareholders,which will get the mostout of state-owned shares and non-state-owned synergies.In order to solve thisproblem,this paper puts forward the idea that the government should set upspecialized state-owned capital operating company of state-owned commercial banksto perform absolute holding on behalf of the government and adopt three layers ofmanagement to realize separate government functions from enterprisemanagement,separate government and capital and separate ownership andmanagement rights.Besides,this paper also puts forward the idea that the proportionof state-owned shares should be not less than51%to maximize the use of its controland influence.This paper takes the problems of state-owned commercial banks to introducenon-state-owned shares as research object,puts forward the idea that it is necessary tointroduce non-state-owned shares which can improve the basic economicsystem,increase the state-owned commercial bank’s capital adequacy ratio,promotethe international level of state-owned commercial banks and the financial industryregulatory levels.However,financial security problem and strategic investorsmetamorphosis problem for financial investors can not be ignored.The causes of theseproblems are the profit-seeking nature of private capital and investment objectdeviation,so it is critical to introduce and control the qualified non-state-ownedshareholders.In order to solve this problem,this paper puts forward the introductiontype,selection criteria,introduction mode and supporting measures of non-state-ownedshareholders.This paper takes the problems of internal governance of state-owned commercialbanks as the research object,puts forward the idea that the defective of corporate governance mechanism is the primary cause and it is critical to set up scientific andefficient decision-making mechanism,fair and reasonable incentive mechanism andpowerful supervision mechanism.In order to solve this problem,this paper putsforward the following ideas.Firstly,this paper puts forward the idea that decisionmechanism of state-owned commercial banks should include category votemechanism and democratic centralism to guarantee a percentage of the decisionmakers of non-controlling shareholders and promote the science and efficiency ofdecision.Secondly,this paper puts forward the idea that executive compensationincentive mechanism should realize combination of equity and efficiency,so it shouldtake differential compensation as core content.On the basis of classifying bankexecutives,this paper designs the state-owned commercial banks incentive evaluationcriteria and salary incentive means to improve the fairness and rationality of incentivemechanism.Thirdly,this paper puts forward the idea that monitoring mechanismshould takes supervisory board as core.On the basis of redefining the internalgovernance rights structure,the supervisory board as the core of the monitoringmechanism is constructed to guarantee the unification of ownership and control andsolve Insider control problem.This paper takes comprehensive performance evaluation standards of propertyright and governance structure of state-owned commercial banks as researchobject,puts forward the idea that existing performance evaluation standards can notobjectively reflect the performance level of property right and governance structure ofstate-owned commercial banks,so it is necessary to design comprehensiveperformance evaluation system.In order to solve this problem,this paper designscomprehensive performance evaluation system on the basis of absorbing mainperformance evaluation system of property rights and corporate governance ofcommercial bank both at home and abroad.The comprehensive performanceevaluation standards highlight the macro performance appraisal and mediumperformance appraisal to fully reflect the real performance of property right andgovernance structure of state-owned commercial banks.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-owned Commercial Bank, Property Right Structure, CorporateGovernance Structure, Performance Evaluation Standards
PDF Full Text Request
Related items