Research On Governance Of Opportunistic Behaviors In Cluster Of Suppliers Based On Joint Liability:from The Perspective Of Sahlins’s Reciprocity Theory

Along with the increasing importance of supply chain management, it becomes far more common for the core enterprise to cooperate with cluster of suppliers aggregated in a same geographic area. However, because of inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between the supplier and the core enterprise, the supplier’s opportunistic tendency becomes increasingly serious in cases of the incremental number of peer suppliers, which will hamper directly the core enterprise’s control over product quality. In order to solve this problem, some enterprises have tried to implement joint liability governance which is prevalent in the microcredit industry to manage cluster of suppliers. However, there is a lack of due concern for this phenomenon in theoretical research area. Whether is joint liability governance implemented by the core enterprise effective in suppressing opportunistic behaviors within the supplier cluster? What is the core mechanism of joint liability governance? Moreover, because of inhabiting in a same geographic area for a long time, complex and different reciprocity relationships have been formed among suppliers within the cluster. In that way, how will different kinds of reciprocity relationships affect the effectiveness of joint liability governance? These research questions are urgent to be explained.Given this, under the context of cooperative relationship of supply chain, this study explores the effectiveness and the core mechanism of joint liability governance implemented by the core enterprise, and probes further the different impacts of different reciprocity relationships on the effectiveness of joint liability governance. Firstly, this study introduces and summarizes the existing literatures on network governance theory, principal-agent theory, and social exchange theory, and reviews the related literatures on Sahlins’ reciprocity theory, joint liability governance, and opportunistic behaviors. The shortages of literatures on these related research topics are pointed out. And then the conceptual model of this study is put forward based on the previous literature reviews. Via theorectical derivation, research hypotheses are raised in regard to the relationship between joint liability among suppliers and their opportunistc behaviors, the mediating effect of peer monitoring among suppliers, and different moderating effects of different reciprocity relationships among suppliers. Then through investigating the cluster of suppliers of an export enterprise in Fujian Province, effective samples of 82 joint liability teams (a total of 246 respondents) are collected. Based on the collected data, statistical softwares of SPSS 22.0 and AMOS 18.0 are employed to test the conceptual model and related research hypotheses. Finally, the main conclusions, theorectical contributions, and pratical implications are discussed. And future research directions are put forward based on the limitations of this study.Through the above theorectical analysis and empirical tests, the main conclusions are as follows:firstly, joint liability among suppliers could inhibit effectively the opportunistic behaviors within the supplier cluster. Secondly, joint liability among suppliers promt suppliers to monitor actively one another by using their own advantages based on considerations of self-interests. Thirdly, the reason for the effectiveness of joint liability among suppliers on their opportunistic behaviors is because of peer monitoring coming out during the implementing process of joint liability governance. Fourthly, when generated reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the inhibiting effect of joint liability among suppliers on their opportunistic behaviors will be weakened. On the contrary, when balanced reciprocity or negative reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the inhibiting effect of joint liability among suppliers on their opportunistic behaviors will also be strengthened. Fifthly, when generated reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the positive effect of joint liability among suppliers on their peer monitoring will be weakened. On the contrary, when balanced reciprocity or negative reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the positive effect of joint liability among suppliers on their peer monitoring will also be strengthened. Sixthly, when generated reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the indirect inhibiting effect of joint liability which is generated through peer monitoring on their opportunistic behaviors will be weakened. On the contrary, when balanced reciprocity or negative reciprocity among suppliers is enhanced, the indirect inhibiting effect of joint liability which is generated through peer monitoring on their opportunistic behaviors will also be strengthened.