Study On The Policy System About Patent Quality Controlling Based On The Perspective Of Interest-driven

With the growth of the number of patent applications and grant, China is also facing the problem of patent quality as well as patent grant delay, If not properly resolved, would seriously affect the incentive effect of the patent system for technological innovation. At present, the way of solving these problems by theorists and practitioners was mostly to improve the efficiency of patent examination process by increasing investment in human resources and hardware patent prosecution unit, but they ignored the role which patent application and patent invalidation procedures can play in patent quality controlling, as well as the economic rationality of each participants, making those reforms did not achieve the desired effect. Therefore, this paper attempted to analyze the economic motives of patent applicants, patent examiners, and patent challenger, through the perspective of profit-driven, and to build policy system of patent quality control on this basis.First, the paper analyzed the general rule of patent policy evolution through dynamic perspective, and the nature of the system applying the theory of entropy. On those basis, the paper made an objective evaluation of the patent policy which China have implemented. Then, the paper made an interpretation of the policy mechanism of "profit-driven".Second, the paper studied the economic motivation behind the behavior of patent speculation and patent expansion. In the first part, the paper analyzed how did speculative patent application make R&D application out of market, with the help of theory of "Market for Lemons", and studied the limitations of the policy tools, such as application fee and statutory creative standard. In the second part, this paper studied the role which the principle of estoppels and the interpretation of patent claims can play in inhibiting patent expansion.Third, the paper analyzed how to adjust the efforts of patent examiner invested in improving speed or assuring quality, from the perspective of the inside of patent office. The paper found that there were soils for principal-agent problem in the patent office, through the analysis of target heterogeneity and asymmetric information. The paper also build the rational planning model of patent examiners to study the effect of the remuneration and appraisal system in the patent offices of European and US on the behavior of patent examiner, and the positive effect of introducing a "quality performance bonuses". Based on the theoretical model, the paper also summarized the problem of our existing patent examination management system and proposed solutions for improvement.Finally, the paper studied the economic motivation of the alleged infringer in the game with the patentee, based on the reality that the patent challenger is always the alleged infringer in patent infringement lawsuit. The paper analyze in detail the direct factors such as, prior art defense, reconciliation, funding difference, the indirect factors such as, positive externalities, the patentee threat strategy, patent information asymmetry and quality of patent examination, which affect the efficiency of patent invalidation. At last, the paper gave advice about how to improve the quality control effect of patent invalidation.