Researchon Farmland Contracting Right Exit And Economic Compensation

Nowadays, the exit of farmland contracting right with compensation has become an unavoidable issue during the rapid development progress of urbanization in China. The traditional agriculture was be on the wane and the arable land resources were wasted and abandoned due to the loss of rural labor. The rural land transfer policies cannot solve the idle and abandonment situation of arable land around the country at all in last years, although the Central Government implemented many policies to encourage farmers to transfer their land through multi-faceted approach, which were supposed to improve the use efficiency of rural land resources. Therefore, it is necessary to set up the mechanism of farmland contracting right exit to encourage farmers to achieve the conversion of their asset, leave the countryside and migrate into cities, which is indicated by the current status of the serious lag between rural land transfer and social economy development. In theoretical, farmers have the same right to get compensation as the passive land-lost farmers due to land acquisition, when they become active land-lost farmers if they exit the farmland contracting right voluntarily. Therefore, it is urgent to solve the problem that to promote the farmland contracting right exit, construct the mechanism of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit and calculate the reasonable economic compensation standard.In order to promote the farmland contracting right exit and provide advices for economic compensation, this research was studied from the perspective of rural household. The choice preferences of farmers to different exit conditions were discussed. The mechanism of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit was constructed, the standard of economic compensation was calculated and the incentive and guarantee measures are put forward based on the analysis of influence factors of farmers’ willingness to exit the farmland contracting right. Firstly, for the purpose of getting the research dynamic of the farmland contracting right exit and farmland abandonment in domestic and oversea, the literaturereview was sorted out. In order to get experience and enlightenment from the existing practice of farmland contracting right exit, the beneficial exploration and problems in Chengdu city, Chongqing city, Jiaxing city and Shaanxi Province were summarized. Secondly, farmers cognition status of arable land property and choice preference of different exit conditions were analyzed by utilize of survey data of 580 rural household in Guanzhong area, Shaanxi Province. Influence factors of farmers’ willingness to exit farmland contracting right were studied by using the Structural Equation Modeling. Thirdly, the economic mechanism of farmland contracting right exit was constructed on the basis of farmers’ willingness to exit the farmland contracting right. The economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit was estimated by the economic theory model and the Contingent Valuation Method. The differences of expected price of standard of farmers refund were analyzed by Ordinal Logistic Model. Also, incentive and guaranteeissues of farmland contracting right exit were discussed combined with the influence factors of farmers’ willingness to exit the farmland contracting right. Finally, policy recommendations of promoting the exit of farmland contracting right and economic compensation were put forward. The primary conclusions of this paper are as follows.I. It is more obvious of farmers’ private cognition of arable land property and farmers’ individual and family characteristics have impact on farmers’ cognition of arable land property. Farmers’ willingness to exit farmland contracting right will be weakening by higher degree of private cognition of arable land property. Besides, there is deviation between farmers’ cognition on farmland property and the national institution arrangement. But deviation would be decrease if farmers are old, farmers’ education level is higher, the income level per capita is higher and the non-agricultural income proportion is larger.II. Although most farmers are not willing to exit farmland contracting right, their willingness would be changed if there were compensation for them. Farmers’ individual characteristics, family characteristics and regional influence would affect farmers’ choice preference on the exit conditions of farmland contracting right and farmers show a great preference on the condition of economic compensation. Base on the research results, farmers prefer to use the actual area of their land as the basis of economic compensation, to use the standard of national land requisition compensation as the standard of economic compensation for exiting farmland contracting right, and to accept multi-years economic compensation with increasing standard amount, which should be changed along with the rising of land price, as the form of economic compensation.III. In accordance with the results of Structural Equation Modeling, Farmers’ willingness to exit farmland contracting right were affected by the rationality of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit, farmers’ expectation of price of economic compensation and farmers’ recognition of social security. The results also show that, the higher the education level of householder, the farther the farmers live away from the nearest town, the more the total family income, the stronger the farmers’ willingness to exit farmland contracting right. In addition, farmers show strong willingness to exit farmland contracting right if they have private cognition for land ownership, if they consider the non-agricultural skill training is necessary, if they approbate the basic function of social security, if they accept the economic compensation and expect high price of economic compensation for exiting the farmland contracting right.IV. The reasonable interval of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit is calculated by use of the household survey data and statistical data. The calculation result of the interval of economiccompensation for exit farmers is between73871.08 to 104438.54 yuan per mu. Take the significant difference between the four cities or districts into consideration, the intervals of economic compensation for each city are calculated separately, they are 88368.93 to 111455.27 yuan per mu, 71269.38 to 98105.36 yuan per mu, 60394.11 to 88587.80 yuan per mu, 75451.86 to 119328.10 yuan per mu in Xian, Xianyang, Baoji and Yangling, respectively. These intervals of economic compensation have significant regional features, so the specific standard of economic compensation should be determined by the combination of financial payment abilityof local government and the level of local economic development in practice.V. Different conditions of farmland contracting right exit, regional features and the local economic development level, family characteristics of household, policy of exit compensation and content of farmland contracting right have impact on farmers’ expectation price of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit. Farmers expectation price of compensation are lower in the condition of using farmland contracting right exchange for social security. Farmers’ expectation price of compensation will increase if the local GDP per capita level is higher, the proportion of first industry in GDP is larger, the distance to the nearest town is closer and the agricultural income per capita of household is higher. Besides, farmers who consider the compensation policy of farmland contracting right exit is stable, concerns for thedaily life after exiting farmland contracting right, requires less content of social security, have a high expectation of compensation price generally.VI. The mechanism of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit is constructed on the basis of farmers’ willingness and preference. The mechanism of economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit were built in accordance with the principle of justice, the principle of “Who is benefited, Who is compensator”, the principle of sustainable development and the Pareto Optimality Principle. The basis, standard and form of economic compensation are analyzed on the foundation of the identifying the main subject, object and receiver of the economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit. The mechanism also suggested that the main responsibility part of the economic compensation should be identified as the actual farmland producer or user, the rural collective economic organization and the government. The three parties were supposed to take responsibility for the economic compensation of farmland contracting right exit. The mechanism of economic compensation also promotes targeted remedies and compensation methods to accompany different characteristics of specific farmers. The raising and forth putting of the compensation funds for the economic compensation also conceived in the mechanism.