The Soviet Union, Afghanistan And The United States: A Game Playing Of Four Sides Of Three Countries In Afghanistan From 1979 To 1989

The War in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 is a very important incident in 20 century. Lots of Chinese and foreign scholars have made instructive research and analysis from different point of view on this war. But looking about the present academic findings and materials they used, we would find that there has a wide research space for us to probe.In December 1979, In order to quell the turbulent and complex situation in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union stubbornly sent its army to Afghanistan. The Afghan Islamic Resistance began the "Jihad" to the Soviet and its puppet in the country under the flag of religion. The United States interfered the Afghan conflict to resist the Soviet Union and became the main holder of the Resistance. This made a trace of rivalry between east and west. On the basis of the other research before and the new materials declassified since 1990s, this dissertation would study the War in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 from the angle of game among the Soviet Union, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), the United States and the Afghan Resistance. For understanding the essential and influence of the Afghan conflict roundly and deeply, it tries to discuss the success and defeat, the gains and loss of the four sides in the three countries.This dissertation is composed of three parts. The introduction reviews the studies nowadays on the War in Afghanistan and shows the object of this study. The conclusion makes summaries and analysis of the whole dissertation to deepen the subject of the study. The main body contains five chapters.The first chapter discusses the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan from the independence of Afghanistan in 1919 to the coup of April 1978, the rise of the Afghan Islamic Resistance and the policy of the United States. Since Afghanistan gained its independence, the Soviet Union had been tried to make it in its own confine and given Afghan economic and military assistance. The two country's relations had great progress after the Second World War and especially when the PDPA was founded in 1965, it became the agent of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The relations of the two country appeared twists and turns after Daud came into power, but their relations were normal. The Afghan Resistance developed when opposing the reform of the government and the leftists in 1960s, and occasionally, they made anti-government battles. The United States made little of Afghanistan at first. In 1950s and 1960s, the United States added its assistance to Afghanistan in order to resist the Soviet Union, but the assistance declined after 1970s. In words, the policy of The United States was limited.The second chapter discusses the relations between the Soviet Union and the PDPA from April 1978 to December 1979, how the Soviet Union decided to send army to Afghanistan, the development of the Afghan Resistance, and the reaction of the United States to the situation in Afghanistan. In 1978-1979, the internal struggle of the PDPA was continued and at the same time the regime of the PDPA is in danger because of the anti-struggle movement. Considering these incidents, the Soviet Union tried to mediate the contradiction between the two fictions and would not send army to Afghan to help pressing the rebels. But according to the situation, the Soviet Union thought the PDPA had no ability to the internal situation, and more importantly its control of the Afghan leader Amin was more and more difficult. So the Soviet Union decided to interfere Afghan internal affairs by force and get rid of Amin. At this time, the Afghan Resistance developed rapidly. They opposed the socialism reform of the Communist regime and established anti-government base in Pakistan an Iran. The officials in the United States government had different ideas about the situation in Afghanistan, but their reaction was peace. The CIA began secret assistance to the Afghan Resistance with Brzezinski's endorse.The third chapter discusses the Soviet Union's policy in Afghanistan under old thinking in 1980-1984, the running up of Afghan Resistance's struggle and the interference of the United States in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union's leaders changed several times in this period and its Afghan policy appeared flexible. But the Soviets weren't going to leave Afghan in fact. When the Soviets encouraged Karmal extended the base of the regime, they made strong aggression to the Resistance. But Karmal couldn't only obtain the sustenance of domestic and the resistance movement was more and more severe. Massoud's resistance was the most extraordinary one. He did his best to be against the Soviets and negotiated with them on ceasefire. Because of the different basic stand, the negotiation was failure. The United States made an ardent reaction to the Soviet Union's invading Afghanistan, but its attitude gradually became faint. After Ronald Reagan was in power, the United States' assistance to the Resistance was open and had some development. However, the differences were still among the officials and the government's Afghan policy had no accurate object.The forth chapter discusses the change of the Soviet Union's policy in Afghanistan in 1985-1987, the reaction of the Resistance to the Afghan situation and the intensifying of the United States' policy. Gorbachev decided to retreat from Afghanistan when he found the military aggression was in vain. He drove the Geneva negotiations positively and urged Najibullah to put the policy of National Reconciliation into practice in order to ease the Soviet Union's retreat. But Najibullah had no ability of carrying out the policy successfully and the Soviets didn't get their object. The Afghan Resistance took steps against the National Reconciliation and tried to combine their operations. The United States hoped the Soviet Union being trouble in Afghanistan, so it increased the assistance to the Resistance and was passive to the Geneva Negotiations. The Americans were clearly hesitate and cautious on its Afghan policy as before.The fifth chapter discusses how the Soviet Union drove and achieved the retreat from Afghanistan, the reaction of relevant sides and their policy after the Soviet Union's leave. From 1988, the Soviet Union mended its pace of leaving Afghanistan and drove the Geneva process more positively. The PDPA continued the failed National Reconciliation to work in the Soviet Union's policy. The Afghan Resistance brought forward its own project of transitional government, but it couldn't have great influence already at that time. The United States stuck to the Symmetry threw obstacles in the Geneva way. Because the Soviet Union was then anxious to leave Afghanistan it didn't consider other sides' attitude any more. It made great effort and the Geneva Accord was made finally in April 1988. But the accord only settled the Soviet Union's problem of retreat and the war didn't disappear in the country. The Afghan Resistance began to aggression the PDPA for seizing power. The Soviet Union and the United States continued providing weapons to the two rivalries in Afghanistan and the country got into a civil war subsequently.