The Principle Of Demonstration In Hegel's Philosophy

The principle of demonstration is the basic issue to comprehend Hegel's philosophy, and they have been ignored for so long time that the ground forms of Hegel's philosophy have been in the status of being closed over. As far as we are concerned, there must be one clear contemplation for this principle in order to understand Hegel's philosophy actually and thoroughly. On the basis of this standpoint, this dissertation gives a theoretical illustration on this question which will make for stepping into one new higher stage to catch on his philosophical thought. It is from the point of form and content to define philosophy, and the content is comprehended as"object"in Hegel's philosophy, furthermore, it is the form of demonstration on the ground of necessity or inevitability of thought that comes to the form of truth. This regulation from Hegel connects with the very viewpoint of comprehending traditional philosophy and shows Hegel's innovation and difference.This dissertation considerably distinguishes the different modes of comprehending philosophy in the background of history of philosophy in order to extrude the principle of demonstration in Hegel's philosophy. Primarily, the concrete consideration concentrates to understand this principle of demonstration as expandedness and development of the thing itself, during which includes the negative taches. Besides, the consequence of developing exposes the method and the expandedness exposes the system, furthermore, this mode of system based on demonstration uncovers the bourn of truth. According to this way, chapter I emphasizes in the substantial signification of this principle of demonstration in the philosophical construction in Hegel's philosophy, insofar as demonstration is the sole way of accomplishing truth in which Hegel has to take. Chapter II points out his demonstration is a construction of ontology that the absolute expands and realizes in and for itself. Since the negative taches are involved in this process of expandedness of the absolute, Hegel's demonstration necessarily includes dialectics, and this contents consist in chapter III. In chapter IV, this principle of demonstration is comprehended as one system so as to indicate one moving and active process in virtue of concealment and evidence, and all of these extrude a highest bourn of thought. There are four parts in this dissertation, the first part mostly discusses the reason why the principle of demonstration is the very way of comprehending Hegel's philosophy, and what the relation between this principle with inevitability. Firstly according to Hegel's definition of philosophy, and then according to the distinguishment of faculties of cognition, we resort to logic to hold the forms of objects. Furtherly, we should clearly know that the logic in Hegel's philosophy is rational logic, the elements of which are notions or concepts as potential deduction, and the way of deduction is the one of notions'expandedness. In this way, the whole process of logical developing shows the principle of demonstration. Besides, we think that the primary demand of demonstration is inevitability and being necessary and this demand is guaranteed by the content of philosophy. Only by the content can we trace back to the highest foundation of things and provide the inevitability for the form of demonstration. In this part, we define the construction of philosophy from two facets, form and content. For one thing, the knowledge of metaphysics needs demonstration. For another thing, the inevitability in demonstration also needs the metaphysical objects to offer. In this way, the expandedness of truth is the unity or unification of form and content, and this unification unifies the thought and being, subject and object. Nevertheless, what undertakes this unification? Only the absolute or God. The jumping-off place of Hegel's philosophy is introduced in this provisional discussion, and the unique attributes of the principle of demonstration in Hegel's philosophy are disclosed.The second part primarily points out the demonstration in Hegel's philosophy is in the sense of ontological demonstration. From the point of the first part, we introduce the springboard of demonstration is the unity of thought and being. Therefore, the principle of demonstration ought to be the self-expandedness of the absolute, and it is in this point that his principle of demonstration is different from the other philosophers. From the point of philosophy of epistemology, the other philosophers start the demonstration from the finite subject, so they can not arrive at the unity of thought and being. It will cancel the objectivity of logic to demonstrate objects as a result of making logic obey the subjective mode of comprehension. As for Hegel, the startpoint of demonstration is the unification of form and content, and this demonstration is also the expandedness of the things themselves. Besides, this startpoint implies"the absolute", it is substance (nomenon), which impenetrates the process of expandedness and holds the demonstration in itself. Therefore, the logic becomes objective. And then we argue that this start of demonstration, namely substance, should be the self-expandedness of the dimension of spirit from the substance to subject. The developing course is carried out by this sujective agent through the form of deduction. The way of self-actualization of things is embodying as one mode of revelation, and the highest substance is latent rather than disclosed, so that the sacred will be embodied only through the movement and changing of concrete objects. Therefore, this mode of realization at the same time is the mode of teleology. The developing and teleology are considered as the two folds of the things in themselves, and both explain the same process. The expandedness keeps the track on the way of developing of thought, and now that the process is a developing one, there must be something transcendent in this course. Namely, the negative taches are involving in this process of expandedness of the thing. And then this carries out the transition of the third part of this dissertation.The purpose of the third part is to indicate that the negative taches are contained in the demonstration of Hegel's philosophy, and this demonstration is different from the traditional philosophy which is based on the law of identity only. The traditional philosophers (such as Aristotle) thought that the objectivity of arguments or demonstration must conform to the law of identity and the law of contradiction. Could it demonstrate things in the form of inevitability if there is contradiction in the process of demonstration? We should know that the negative taches are the dialectic taches. In this part, the beginning and changing of dialectics are explored in the history of philosophy and from the cognitional faculties of human being, from this point of view, it explains how Hegel overcomes dialectics on the basis of rationality. We think that dialectics is the consequence of the fault of alternation in form and content, and the fundamental cause lies in the absolutization of the form of understanding. And"the logic of opinion"would come if we use this form to demonstrate phenomenon,"the logic of illusion"would come if we use it to comprehend the transcendent objects. In the face of Kant's so-called"the logic of illusion", Hegel contemplates and solves this question, now that the process of demonstration is that of self-expandedness of thing in itself, the process of expandedness should be impenetrated by one substantial thing, and this substance gives the basis of the whole process of expandedness, so the negative taches are only the differentiations from the substance itself. Therefore, the substance can draw this differentiations back into itself as well. In this way, the affirmation is attained on the basis of the negatory, and this assures the inevitability of the demonstrational process and creates new knowledge as well. Accordingly, we regard this way as"internal transcendence"rather than"external transcendence". The former is concluded into two facets of negative negation and unity of analysis and synthesis, then the construction of Hegel's method comes to be disclosed. And this mode of demonstration through negative negations internally is another diffenrence from traditional philosophers.The fourth part is the logical consequence of the third part. Demonstration is the self-expandedness of the thing in itself which involves negative taches in the process of expandedness and then the system is built. In this fourth part, we mostly discuss why and how Hegel's principle of demonstration embodies as a form of system and problem of the structure of system. Whether or not can this principle of demonstration embody one system is another difference in Hegel's philosophy from the others. Fichte and Schelling were not willing to make their philosophy be system, mostly because they could not ascend the mode of comprehending philosophy to demonstration and so not construct one system. As far as we are concerned, there are only Hegel and Aristotle constructing philosophy as systems in the history of philosophy. As the lack of dimension of ego in epistemology in ancient Greece, the Aristotle's system of philosophy strongly has ingredients of external reflection and little internal life mechanism. As we all know, the construction in Hegel's philosophy is one developing process increasingly higher. In the low stage, the thing of matter dominates the process, only in the super stage, the thing gets rid of the bondage of matter and embodies its form. Therefore, the process of developing is one from matter to form. In the end of this developing, thing owns the pure form as its very content. The method is the form of form and be only manifest in this stage as the highest configuration. And this is why Hegel always discusses the problem of method simply in the end of his logic. The expandedness of method shows the system, which is not the external determination but rather the abstractest form of construction of philosophy and the absolute completeness at the same time. Therefore, we call the system as clarification of bourn of thought in this sense, which is as well the process of representation and arisement, construction and deconstruction. This bourn is carried out by this system which in turn is deconstructed during this bourn of thought in the end. However, it is not one passive elusion from the world in this highest bourn of Hegel's philosophy, but rather one necessary tach actively facing up to restriction and negation during which the tourn discloses itself. Only by transcending inevitability, we are capable of catch this inevitability from the objective attitudes, and it is the best explanation of this sentence,"the truth of inevitability is freedom."This dissertation is written by the way of the construction of Hegel's philosophy, it introduces the thing in itself from the principle of demonstration, then from the thing in itself to the process of its realization. And the method embodies from the beginning to the end, which in turn is systemized during this process. It is one course of thinking from the potentiality to actuality, from matter to form as well. In fact, the whole process is one unification of form and content, and there is one substance thoroughly during every stage of method. Therefore, Hegel actualizes one scientific logic on the ground of rationality, which also has substance everywhere and would never be one groundless logic.