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Study On The Tariff Of Infant Industries Protection

Posted on:2001-01-06Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X HouFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360002952338Subject:Agricultural mechanization project
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The tariff of infant industry protection is important to quick development of its competition capacity. At beginning of the dissertation, the definition and range of infant industry were given and the goal and reason of industry protection were discussed. Then, the anticipative effect of the industry protection was taken as the criterion to judge whether or not the infant industry should be protected. The methods and functions of the infant industry protection were discussed with the conclusion that the overprotection wants for market competition resulted from lack of market demand and that moderate protection was needed. Infant industry protection system and the mechanism of its inner interaction were analyzed systematically. The dissertation analyzed the industry protection equilibrium ilemma between both sides of the contractors. Thereafter, Put forward the concept of treaty equilibrium. For the first time, A model of the treaty tariff of infant industry protection was established with four players, viz two contracting nations and their industries. The model has three levels and combines games and programming. In the model which has one product, the first level is a multi-goal programming, the decision-making variable is treaty tanff ,the second level is a nonlinear programming and the optimum tariff will he decided, the third level is a game, the industries decide the sale in domestic market and quantity of export by competing. By means of converse induction and K conditions, The Nash equilihriurn,optimum tariff mid the treaty tariff was solved. The outcome was discussed under different parameters. Smuggling is a disadvantage to the industry protection. Anti-smuggling measure should be studied for effective industry protection On the basis of analyzing smuggling and it disadvantages, the dissertation firstly set up the game of complete information model between custom and smugglers, which put the tariff, anti-smuggling cost amid the puiiishnient effect into players payment functions and derived the solution of blend Nash equilibrium. Then, in the blend Nash equilibrium, the dissertation discussed the impacts of tariff, anti-smuggling cost and probability, punishment effect, etc on the solutioii of the Nash equilibrium. The dissertation supports anti-smuggling duty of the customs. The character of dynamic moderate scale ot infant industry, which was related to the long-tenn cost curve was analyzed. Based on the models of Grossman and Horn, the dissertation firstly acquired the necessary conditions of technique indexes for credible finns mid the separate coiiditions of technique index between fly-by-nights firms and credible finns. Under the hypothesis of two types of quality, the dissertation demonstrated how the tariff acts on the structure under industry, and also acquired the limit to moderate protection. The dissertation analyzed industrial organization structure which varies with the three states of protections which are less protection, moderate protection and over protection, and the transformation processes of each other. The dissertation analyzed the static game equilibrium between the govermunemmt and infant industry under different conditiomis, mid established the complete information dynamic game model of infant industry protection of three participants, viz, government country A, infant industry of country A and the industry of country B. According to converse induction, the calculatiomi process of the sub-game perfect equilibrium was given. And also the dissertation extended the participant strategic sets to closed one. At the same time of dynamic game m...
Keywords/Search Tags:Infant Industry, Moderate Protection, Incentive Mechanism, Smuggling, Treaty Tariff Model, the Car Industry
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