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Chinese Stock Market Insider Trading Information Disclosure Mode

Posted on:2004-08-08Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y LiFull Text:PDF
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Using methods of game theory and information economics, we study the "insider" trade and information disclosure of the listed company in the securities markets of china in this dissertation.The dissertation is comprised of three parts, and includes 8 chapters.The first part, which includes chapter one and chapter two, puts forward the theory and method and problem that the dissertation will study. The first chapter introduces the background of the "insider" trade and their information disclosure. The second chapter introduces the relevant research on the economic theory, method and model of "insider" trade and their information disclosure. It gives the base for further study.The second part, which includes chapter three and chapter four, studies the reciprocal influence between securities market and "insider" trade. In chapter three we study the influence of market trade mechanism on "insider" trade by using order trade model, and concludes that there is adverse choice on "insider" trade regardless of in what kind of market trade mechanism. In chapter four we study the influence of "insider" trade on each participator of our country's security market by using extended forms of one-stage batch trade Kyle model, and conclude that "insider" trade benefits individual investors with permission for "insider" trade.The third part, which includes chapter five to chapter eight, is the main contents of the dissertation, It distinguishes company's general disclosure and "insider" trade disclosure, and analyzes respectively. In chapter five we analyze the relation between "insider" trade and company's general information disclosure. Using order trade model and Bayesian principle, we prove that company's "insider" is more willing to reveal good news and conceal bad news in our country's securities market. In chapter six and chapter seven we study information disclosure about "insider" trade, and concludes that the "insider" trade information disclosure benefits some investors, but harms other investors .In chapter six, we analyze the market manipulation problem which probably happens in "insider" trade, and give the condition that "insider" trade results in market manipulation, and point out that the rule of forbidding "insider" undertaking short-term trade can effectively reduce market manipulation. In chapter seven, we analyze mainly the positive influence on security market about the "insider" trade information disclosure. On the base of Kyle's two-stage batch trade model, we analyze ex post and ante post pattern of the trade information disclosure respectively, and prove that each disclosure pattern is helpful to reduce "insider"'s dominance of private information. According to the present situation of the legal regulations of our country securities market, we put forward the preliminary frame of the regulation system about "insider" trade and "insider" trade information disclosure pattern In chapter eight.
Keywords/Search Tags:Insider trade, Information disclosure, Private information, Regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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