The Game Theoretical Study On Banking Supervisory Behavior

Using game theory, this paper investigates collusive issues in china's banking industries supervisory behavior currently. Through systematical analysis of causing collusive behavior micro-mechanism and put forward mechanism on proofing financial risk, the aim is to improve on banking supervisory approaches, establishes effective supervisory system, proof financial risk, advances banking supervisory performance in all things.The using approaches in composing dissertation involve the game theory, principal-agent theory and experimental economics. The studying innovation includes: 1) analytic approaches are frontier. Using game theory, constructed a game analytic modeling of banking supervisory behavior, which may clearly analyze collusive behavior between supervisor and manager. At laboratory, using experimental economics approaches, we make a controled experiment on subjects, and observe their collusive behavior, which is impossible in real life. By different experimental design, using statistic analytic methods, we can evidently distinguish these factors affecting collusive behavior. 2) The studying conclusions have value applied, according to these conclusion, we not only may directly guide mechanism design of proofing banking supervisory collusion behavior, but also can indirectly have reference effect for other industries. 3) Using game theory, this paper shows systematically analysis on banking supervisory collusive behavior, literatures at home are relatively a few and quietly finitude.By experimental research, I find that supervisory collusion behavior relatewith established each other trust and reciprocity during mostly repeated game, and reciprocity related with not enough incentive and not severely punishment too. The game theoretical analysis models show: lacking owner, supervisor's wages, his marginal performance of polity and surplus-taking rights affect in all supervisory collusion behavior. At the same time, asymmetric information and hierarchies of supervisory organization are issues of being paid attention. Therefore, related with the ideas of international banking supervision development according to china's banking supervisory actuality at present, an relatively feasible mechanism design on proofing banking supervisory collusion behavior should include: Institute a sound supervisory incentive constraint mechanism as soon as possible, increase punishable degrees, raise supervisor's wages, advocate rivalry between supervisors, adjust design of supervisory organization, intensify construction of banking informational transparency, accelerate state-owner commerce bank stock-institution reconstruction, transform structure of property rights, gradually establish a mechanism of owner-selves supervision.