Game Analysis Of Entrepreneurial Behavior

In this dissertation we studied the entrepreneur behavior with the analytical technology of Game Theory and Information Economics.The main contents of this dissertation are divided into five parts which are as follow:In chapter one we give an introduction to the Game Theory and pay much attention to the Refinement process of Nash equilibrium. We also give a brief introduction to the optimal incentive mechanism design that is studied in the Information Economics. According to the need of our analysis we summed up briefly the Thoughts of enterprise where may be the starting points for my studies.In chapter two we make a model for Entrepreneur Decision Ability and study how to allocate the abilities optimally in the organization of firm. We have four propositions for the allocation. Finally we analyze the existence of the Equilibrium point for the market of demand and supply of entrepreneurial abilities in this chapter.In chapter three we research the mechanism of screening entrepreneurial ability and selection of manager for firm. With the application of 'revelation principle' to the model that we have made for the condition that the variable of entrepreneurial ability has 'a linear down distribution',we compare the solution to our model with the solution to the first-price sealed auction model. With the model we have made we study the mechanism of self-screening entrepreneurial ability. Moreover we use the Signaling Game Model which was used by M.Spence for the equilibrium analysis of job market to analyze the equilibrium of entrepreneurial ability market. The conclusion is that there is a separating equilibrium point to the market of the entrepreneurial ability for the high ability and low ability. Also we study the mechanism of appointment to firm's leader which play a very important role for the firm's competition..In chapter four we research the 'Incentive Game' between the investor and the manager in the firm in which the ownership and the control is separated. We find that the way for the players to avoid the prisoner's dilemma is to use a cooperative strategy . In this chapter we also study the temptation of entrepreneur's corruption and make a Anti-corruption Game model to analyze the policies for anti-corruption.In the last chapter we apply the theory established in the preceding chapters to the analysis of reform policies for state-owner enterprise in China and have some new knowledge to it. Finally we conclude my dissertation and put the shortages in this dissertation forward to give directions to the future studies.