Analysis Of Collusive Corruption Based On Game Theory

Collusive corruption has become one of the most important tendencies in contemporary China, but also an important and common characteristic among various types of corruption. Therefore, a key challenge confronting anti-corruption in contemporary China is the study on how collusive corruption produces, develops and evolutes. If we can deeply analyze the behavior patterns and its causes of collusive corruption, grasp the behavior characteristic and the interaction pattern among the collusive corruptors, this will put forward meaningful and referential ideas to the study of Anti-Corruption in China.Collusive corruption, popularly known as the collective corruption, means many officials or merchants conspire with others to corrupt. One important cause of this phenomenon is the improvement of institution system, which greatly tighten the restraint on and supervision over the use of power, the happening of individual corruption becomes more difficult. Compared with domestic and foreign experts and scholars on the research of collective corruption, the author defines collusive corruption as many corrupt individuals conspire to abuse the public power and pursue their personal maximum interests with complementary corruption conditions. Compared with other forms of corruption, collusive corruption emphasizes more on the interaction of corrupt individuals rather than the number of corrupt individuals.In the game model of collusive corruption, it proposes that there are two actors in this game and they choose to conspire with others or not in order that they can receive the optimal interest. Basic model is extended to four game models: one static game model with complete information, one dynamic game model with complete information, one static game model with incomplete information and one dynamic game model with incomplete information. Four different models explain the cause of the collusive corruption and discuss the influences of parameters such as penalty, probability of investigate and prosecute and corruption payoffs under different risk level. The conclusion shows that the risk level will become an important factor influencing the strategic option of corrupt individuals and also the likelihood of collusive corruption.