A Research On The Theories And Methods Of Management Buy-out

Based on the current theoretical as well as empirical research results, this doctoral dissertation probes and analyzes the theories and methods of Management Buy-out (MBO) comprehensively. It aims at offering a few innovative remarks so that later researchers in this area may come up with valuable opinions, taking the role of introducing the inner mechanism and related knowledge of MBO to the Chinese enterprises and pushing forward the transactions in China healthily and orderly.Starting from the introduction of MBO, this dissertation utilizes the theories as well as methods of property economics, contract economics, human resource management and game theory to analyze the economic mechanism of MBO. Besides, it presents the governance mechanism as well as decision distribution mode of MBO, and develops the conclusion that that financing system and outside supervision are two vital chains in MBO. Consequently, it further discusses the financing system and outside supervision system. Eventually, it uses the methods of case study and statistic method to make a empirical analysis of sample MBO listed companies in China, summarizes their successful and failed experiences and makes some suggestions on the strategic reorganization of stated-owned enterprises by means of MBO.Chapter two introduces the concept, characteristics and practical models of MBO, analyzes its motives, origin and developing trends, and compares MBO transactions in China with these in foreign countries.Chapter three analyzes the economic meanings of MBO. Firstly, it testifies the incompleteness of MBO contract, discloses the limitation in incentive effect created by MBO, uncovers the relationship between the human capital of management and the incentive effect of MBO, and explains the incentive effect of MBO in terms of group production theory.Chapter four studies the decision distribution of MBO. Through the analysis of governance mechanism of MBO, it comes up with that the division of knowledge will determine the distribution of decision right. Furthermore, it analyzes the efficiency of MBO and the theory of decision distribution on thebasis of former research results, and presents the optimum distribution model of MBO decision creatively.Chapter five probes the outside supervision and the protection of minority shareholders' interests after MBO, which is comprised of the introduction of theoretical foundation for outside supervision, the analysis of necessity of enforcing outside supervision and the related measures to protect minority shareholders' interests.Chapter six discusses the financing system of MBO, which analyzes the financing structure of MBO, discloses the main problems in Chinese MBO financing system, develops some suggestions on how to develop and elaborate the MBO financing resources in China, and constructs a trust plan of MBO based on asset securitization.Chapter seven makes a empirical analysis of MBO cases of listed companies in China, sums up the general characteristics of these listed companies from the points of acquisition model and financial effects, and discusses their governance efficiency by means of statistics method.