Corporate Governance Research, And Management Buyouts

Corporate governance structure will change fundamentally as the ownership structure changes after Management Buyouts. Corporate control will be centralized and delivered to the minority from the majority. Outsider supervision shifts into insider supervision. The sheer incentive of salary transfers to the incentives of control power and residual right. The manager as an agent becomes a manager as a principal. Corporate governance structure mainly specifies the choosing of the entrepreneurs of enterprises, the distribution of corporate control, the managerial incentive and constraint and etc. This dissertation principally studies on the relationship between MBO and corporate governance structure from the above several points. The article is composed of seven chapters. The layout is as follows:Chapter 1. The Review of Theories on Management Buyouts. In general, there are two different views on MBO. One thinks that MBO can raise the efficiency (Jensen, 1989). The other's regards MBO as just a reallocation of wealth (Reich, 1989; Lowenstein, 1985). This chapter provides a methodological and empirical analysis to research MBO integrated the perspectives of the economics and management behavioral.Chapter 2. The Relationship between Management Buyouts and Corporate Governance Structure. The main proposal in this chapter is to investigate and appraise MBO how and in what level to improve corporate governance structure and alleviate agency problems. This chapter firstly reviews the theoretical relationship between MBO and corporate governance structure. In addition, it reviews the conclusions and tests on MBO .Finally it briefly comments the theories and conclusions with empirical analysis .Chapter 3. MBO and Transition of Corporate Control. In this chapter, the author firstly introduces the corporate control theory, the definition of corporate control, the allocation of control power, the impact on corporate performance and the relationship between corporate property right and control power. In addition, it analyses that MBO how to impact Chinese state-owned firms' corporate control.Chapter 4. MBO and Choosing of the Entrepreneur of Enterprises. As a corporate activity, MBO will influence the choosing of the entrepreneur of enterprises. The author thinks MBO can solve the entrepreneur's problems of enterprises from three aspects. First of all, MBO can let the person with entrepreneur's ability become the entrepreneur. Secondly, MBO can motivate the entrepreneurship of the entrepreneur. Finally, MBO can also really realize the maximum value of the entrepreneur.Chapter 5. MBO and Corporate Incentive and Constraint. In general, the theory of corporate incentive and constraint mechanism sums up the modern firm theory and the principle and agency theory and the management theory and etc.. At the same time,...