Anglo-american Military Historical Investigation (1919-1945),

This is a dissertation about military history and military diplomacy history, which elaborates the development of British and American military strategy from 1919 to 1945.In August 1919, British government, owing to predicament of national economy and finance, began to carry out "Ten Year Rule" which regulated no major war in next ten years. While in 1931 the Japanese plotted "September 18th incident" and in 1933 Hitler came to power, British government abrogated "Ten Year Rule" in November 1933. But the Rule yielded lots of negative influence to pre-war strategy.In the above scene, British government abandoned the traditional "Two-Power Navy Standard". After having aware of war menace, appeal of regaining "Two-Power Navy Standard" by Admiralty was strong increasingly, but there was no decisive answer from the Government. Because the Second World War broken out, new "Two-Power Navy Standard" was aborted. On the other hand, naval strategic emphasis had been changed eventually as follows: home water first, Mediterranean second, the Far East third. Royal Air Force was only armed service being given preferential treatment. In 1923, the Government set out to apply "One-Power Air Standard". Then its imaginary enemy changed from France to Germany, the deterrent air strategy that purely chased for parity on the number of bomber, however, could not prevent Hitler's war. Army was the most overlooked service, under the condition of war menace increasingly from European continent the Government finally had to decide to dispatch an expedition force in wartime, although this continental commitment was extremely reluctant.United States military, in most of time before joining into war, mainly devoted to studying Plan Orange, Plan Red and Plan Red-Orange, first special. In May 1939, the outlines of Plan Rainbow series were formulated. Particularly, Plan Rainbow 5 which finished in April 1941 basically was close to future wartime facts. Victory Program, which finished in September 1941, provided material guarantee for enforcing war plans. In addition, though these were not formal war plan, the Army War College offered drill of Plan "participated with Allies" from 1934 to 1940, which to certain extend strengthened the strategic thought in Plan Rainbow later.Promoted by the Japanese invading China in a large scale in 1937, Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, director of Navy War Plan Division, who being directed by President Roosevelt, went London to meet with the British opposite next year early. It symbolized a beginning of Anglo-American Strategic cooperation. Until American entering into war, there were several staff talks between the British and the American in 1939, 1940 and 1941. Scope involved had been extended from the Pacific to the Atlantic; armed services involved were added by the Army and the Air. ABC Conversation in January to March 1941, setting the grand strategy of Europe first, was milestone of Anglo-American strategic co-operations.However, owing to different national interests and strategic tradition, there was a different understands of the grand strategy of Europe first. British "indirect strategy" advocated attrition to enemy through economic blockade, air raid and subversion, when enemy strength was weakening a decisive campaign would be carried out. American "direct strategy" believed that it was better to defeat enemy as soon as possible through the overwhelming forces. From the Arcadia in December 1941 to the second Quebec Conference in September 1944, the dispute of Anglo-American strategy on Europe and the Pacific continued. Before Trident Conference in May 1943, British strategy often was more initiative, for instance, Churchill's Gymnast operation put in force and his plan of Italy implemented limitedly. But after the Trident, American strategy often succeeded the British's. In Tehran, operation Overlord was decided firmly and Churchill's plan of Italy-Balkans was more limited. Then American Pacific operation's scale became increasingly larger, while the British asked for joining into main American operations in the Pacific, the American were indifferent to the British request, even excluded the British in the Pacific.There existed a manifest feature of collaboration and conflict in prewar and wartime Anglo-American strategic cooperation. Strategic initiative between Britain and America was decided by each nation's power. The course of victory of war was the course of the British depending on the American increasingly too. Postwar this reliance displayed more clearly, moreover this feature still continued now to some extend.