THE ROLE OF CHINA IN AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY FROM PEARL HARBOR TO THE FALL OF 1944

This study analyzes Sino-American military relations from Pearl Harbor to the recall in October 1944 of General Joseph Stilwell, the commander of American forces in China. Sino-American relations are approached within the context of a global war rather than, as has so often been done, from the perspective of a regional war theater. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that American decisions regarding China were vitally affected by developments in the various other theaters of the world-wide struggle.;A primary theme of the study was that the American relationship with China was more tense and strained than has been customarily depicted in scholarly literature on the subject. Moreover, the thesis attempts to reveal that American policy towards China was far more hardheaded and conversely far less sentimental than has too often been portrayed.;The time frame December 1941 to October 1944 has been selected because during these many months America's China policy was focused upon the objective of winning the war against Japan. Other considerations--diplomatic, political and economic--were subordinate to military requirements. At the time of Stilwell's recall, a fundamental shift in America's China policy was already under way. China had become a negligible factor in the prosecution of World War II. American aims were rapidly turning to diplomatic and political targets.;To substantiate the foregoing interpretations, the thesis has examined General Stilwell's mission in China from March 1942 to October 1944, a period during which he sought, despite Chiang Kai-shek's uncooperativeness, to refashion the Chinese Army and take offensive action against the Japanese. General Stilwell's relations with the Generalissimo, President Roosevelt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General George C. Marshall have been carefully plumbed. Notable amongst the source materials used have been the Marshall Papers, the Roosevelt Papers, the Hopkins Papers, the Stimson Papers and the Foreign Relations Series of the United States.;The United States could not deal with China without considering at every step the sensitivities and aspirations of the British Government. The interplay of the contrasting American and British attitudes towards China has been examined and compared especially in the many wartime conferences. In the East, Anglo-American military collaboration was riven by fundamental national goals; by contrast, in the West, differences between the two allied powers usually dwelt upon matters of basic military strategy.;Much of the relevant source material for the thesis has already been uncovered. It has, however, not been dealt with thoroughly or correctly. Previous writers have injected into the wartime period their own particular narrow viewpoints. They have too often read into the history of the war years conclusions which have been derived from their experiences during the Cold War. A reexamination of the materials has revealed that much of major significance has been slighted or ignored. Some new material, particularly OSS Papers and the Currie Papers, has been utilized.