Basic Research On Government-Leading Bank-Enterprise Legal Relationship In China

This dissertation is written in an attempt to probe into the legal relationship between banks and enterprises and the regulation of the bank-enterprise relationship in China from the perspective of economic law, including financial law, and economic analysis. A comparative analysis of basic theories for various models of bank-enterprise relationship is carried out, a normative reasoning advanced, and a relevant empirical analysis made, so that the bank-enterprise relationship is confirmed to be a government-leading one. A further analysis is then given to the emergence, causing, and legal regulation of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship in China. A discussion is then engaged in the structural bank-enterprise legal relationship in the U.S.A., which is termed relationship between banking and commerce in that country. Finally, some issues are explored, which are related to the bank-enterprise relationship, but yet to be studied by others. We conclude that the Chinese government-leading bank-enterprise relationship is an effective institution in line with China's actual conditions.The different models of bank-enterprise relationship are determined by different countries' actual conditions, including the history and current situation of those countries' society, politics, culture, economy and financial system. And various economic and financial theories are developed to construe the reasonableness for each of these models, argue their pros and cons, and give directions and recommendations for adopting a specific model. But however different these theories are, they can be categorized into two broad trends of thought: liberalism and state interventionism. The difference of the two basic ideas determines the difference in economic and financial constructions and directions towards bank-enterprise relationship, and in turn determines the difference in evaluation of a specific bank-enterprise relationship model. This article also draws certain regularities of bank-enterprise relationship, and divides it into three categories, i.e., structural bank-enterprise relationship, interactive bank-enterprise relationship, and systematic bank-enterprise relationship, which are composed of twelve subcategories, that is, twelve specific relationships. This supplies a relatively reasonable framework for future approach of the nature of bank-enterprise relationship.Meanwhile, mechanisms have been discovered for conduction of the government-enterprise relationship directly to bank-enterprise relationship or conduction of government- enterprise relationship to the bank-enterprise relationship through the government-bank relationship, as well as conduction of government-bank relationship directly to the bank-enterprise relationship. Furthermore, an analysis is conducted about factors influencing bank-enterprise relationship. Then, a close relationship between the government-leading bank-enterprise legal relationship in China and the controlling position of the government in the government-enterprise and government-bank legal relationships is argued. As for the bank-enterprise legal relationship per se, basic concepts of this relationship are introduced, and the causes of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship, including influence of China's macro-control law on the bank-enterprise relationship, are closely examined. It is discovered that a concept called relationship between banking and commerce in the U.S.A. is similar to the bank-enterprise relationship in China, while there is not such a term as the bank-enterprise relationship in the U.S.A. A related topic called separation of banking and commerce is found and, with a few exceptions, a policy of separation of banking and commerce has long been pursued in the institution of the structural bank-enterprise relationship in the U.S.A. Even the 1999 Financial Service Modernization Act, which has lifted the prohibition of mixed operations, does not break this rule. Then a legal analysis is stressed on the loan risk directly related to banks' bad assets, and systematic legal measures for prevention and treatment of the loan risks are suggested. Also, opinions and suggestions on a few topics are lodged, which were not found to have been studied in the available materials during our legal research on banks and enterprises. In the Conclusion, a conclusive evaluation of the government-leading bank-enterprise relationship in China is attempted, and suggestions are offered for optimization of the legal institution for the current Chinese bank-enterprise relationship.