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Research On Horizontal Coordinating Mechanism Between Basin Governments

Posted on:2009-03-18Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360245975342Subject:Administrative Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Basin, as CPRs, has combined characteristics of non-excludability and competitiveness. So the two characteristics are often regarded as the fundamental causes of negative externality of disposing and using basin'water. But the two characteristics can't be the reliable and enough explanation of crowding effect and over-used effect. In fact, the cause of negative externality is that the basin governments provide local protection for micro subjects'negative external behaviors in their own regions.At the same time, local protection brings externality of regional economic activities. The cause is that the obscure boundary of power between basin governments increases the transaction cost. In the light of new institutional economics, it's necessary to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments, in order to regulate power between basin governments, decrease the transaction cost aroused by conflicts. If that, the externality of regional economic activities can be cleared up and the worsening problem of negative externality of disposing and using basin'water can also be resolved.According to the models of the Tragedy of the Commons, Prisoners'Dilemma and the Logic of Collective Action, it's impossible to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments, but we can get reverse optimistic conclusions from the interpretation of these aspects, such as demonstration from the model of Measure for Measure and Institutionalism; impetus of citizens'exit option and appealing, highlight of common interest of basin community and advancement of government officials'self-conscious reason.So it's possible to construct horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments. Its main type can also be classified into bureaucratic mechanism, marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism getting inspiration from New Institutional Economics.According to the relative analysis of New Institutional Economics, all these three coordination mechanisms can cause transaction cost, so we evaluate factors which influence transaction cost, make comparisons and then choose the coordination mechanisms which cause the least transaction cost to substitute for the other two. However, the real world is so variable espaicialy in post-industrialty that single mechanism can't resolve the problem of negative externality of disposing and using basin'water, the reasonable choice is to combine the three coordination mechanisms to get comprehensive effects on the premise that one of three should displace and lead the others standing on measuring the exchange cost.The bureaucratic mechanism is carried out in forms of constructing united and independent basin management bureau, completing the law of basin, carefully uniting administrative district, establishing the government's performance evaluation system of green GDP and consolidating integrity of the ruling Party's resources. Sometimes the bureau mechanism can get good effect by such forms. However, limited by the hypothesis of complete information, zero-supervision cost and various-degree defects of its forms in the practice, the bureaucratic mechanism usually faces the inevitable operation problems and often failed.The marketing mechanism highlights the competition system and property right system. The strategic choices are as follows: running water rights transition, building basin-ecological-compensation, putting pollution charge and emission trading into practice, starting privatization in wastewater treatment establishment. In general, these strategic choices of the marketing mechanism are useful to regulate the functions of basin government and resist the local protection. So it can enhance the cooperation among basin governments and the cooperative governing of negative externality. But the functions of strategic choices are comparative, even in the guard of government power.Self-government mechanism can be carried out in forms of building basin public energy field, molding intergovernmental e-governance, forming alliances between basin governments and making watershed planning. The common characteristics of these are to cooperatively govern the negative externality of disposing and using basin'water by deliberative means. So this is easy to understand and compromise mutually, enhance the responsibility sense for the basin community and correct unreasonable conception by means of absorbing all useful ideas. Of course, Self-government mechanism is fallible if only depended on the social capital.In the views of culture and institution, the author makes comparative study of America, France and Australia. The three countries have various characteristics of major horizontal mechanism of coordination between basin governments. It is worthwhile to pay attention to the common points that the three countries all highlight the comprehensive application of bureaucratic mechanism, marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism. Also, this confirms the suggestion stated above.Through study of water pollution govern in Huai River in 1994-2004, it can be found that the dominated bureaucratic mechanism operated by the State Department has a lot of problems in the practice. Meanwhile, the effort of trying marketing mechanism and self-governance mechanism is not sufficient. These had resulted in the astonishing failure of ten-year Huai River governing. So the next choice is to construct and complete the three coordination mechanisms.
Keywords/Search Tags:Basin, Water Resource's Disposing and Using, Negative Externality, Basin Governments, Horizontal Coordination, Bureaucratic Mechanism, Marketing Mechanism, Self-governance Mechanism
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