Research On The Control Right Theory Of The Firm

The firm is the vital clue of human civilization progress. The control right of the firm is not only a crucial factor for understanding the nature of firm, but also the most mysterious part of the"Black-Box"of firm. Foreign scholars have done many rather deep researches on the control right of the firm, especially the property theory after R.Coase, and even regard the control right as significant contents of its theoretical system. Recently, combined with our country's firm practical, domestic scholars have started to discuss the control right theory whilst researches are not quite embedded. Based on imperfect contract theory, this paper utilizes some analysis methods like the combination of the latitudinal and the longitudinal, redefines the concept of the control right, introduces the new concept, the Present Speed, in order to widen the research content on the control right; meanwhile, it analyzes the source, function, configuration and margins of the control right systematically, with constructing the frame on the control right at first step, which make the control right theory tend to be systematic and standardized.I. The basic issue researches on the Control RightAlthough theorists have done some researches on the Control right for a long time, the theory of Control right is always facing the problems about unstable basic theory, vague connotation and denotation and unclear boundary. This paper analyses the fundamental content on the control right, discusses the imperfect contract and invalid investment, discriminates the right, power, firm and politics contract, meanwhile, settles the existing documents on the control right, systemizes the early economists'ideas and Neoclassical economics theory on the Control right problems. These problems lead to three main dilemmas: few achievements to some deep degree, chaos about the connotation and denotation of the control right and the long-term dominance of control right and imperfect theory system. The reasons: firstly, the control right lacks stable theoretical foundation; secondly, the informal contract of the control right connotation; thirdly, the complexity of the control right itself.II. The redefinition concept on the control rightThe control right is defined as the leading right of distribution on firm production, investment, marketing management and rents organization in the Contract Theory. In addition, the paper carries on research on original production organization, classical firms and existing forms of the control right in modern forms individually; analyzes the three evolution stages of the control right; constructs the structure of the control right, which is consisted of clear and residual control right, and residual control right is made up of residual basis control right and residual development control right. This structure of the control right, not only can avoid conflicts about goals in firms, but also it can ensure the creation and distribution by residual development. It achieves the individual and organizational goals.III. The expansion research on the control rightThe expansion research on the control right is divided into four parts. Firstly, the control right results from the research. The paper studies the content and classification of substance resource and human resource, considering that material property is not the unique source of the control right. To analyze the sources on control right and fundamental features about material property and human property, the paper comes up with the concept"present speed". The source can be divided into the direct and the indirect source. The direct one result from material property whiles the other from the human property. What we can gain is the specificity and the unspecific of property. The two things possess different"present speed", but they can affect the allocation of the control right. Secondly, the functional research on the control right. The paper assesses current research results on the function of control right and classifies the basis and development function on the control right. The former extends the fundamental residual control right; the latter extends developmental residual control. The basic functions can solve the profit conflict of all subjects in the firm contract, and the development function can solve some issues which are related to the firm organization. Two functions can ensure the valid operation of firm organization; thirdly, the control right allocates researches. The paper thinks that the allocation of firm contract is not static, but it is mobile according to the specificity and unspecific. The specificity is crucial to gain advantages and both the owners of material property and human property and improve the proprietary property for gaining more organizational funds. In the firm on main material, material property firstly gains the residual development control right; in the firm on main human material, it gains the residual development control right after the specificity fully achieves; finally, the research on the returns of the control right. The paper analyses"Reserved Revenue","Rents Organization"and other concepts and emphasizes the rents organization. Meanwhile, studies deep in relation between the specificity and the proprietary.IV. The empirical study on the control right of Chinese state-owned enterprisesControl right of Chinese state-owned enterprises refers to the dominant right of the estate-owned enterprises when it achieves diversity goals and allocates organizational rents. This section uses the former analysis of the control right theory for companies to conduct an empirical study for Chinese state-owned enterprises. It mainly makes an in-depth study including the benefit function and resource of control right, the current status, reason, problem of allocation control right for Chinese state-owned enterprises. On this basis, the article proposed the operability of recommendations to solve the problem of the control right for Chinese state-owned enterprises. For instance, it clarifies the development goal of Chinese state-owned business, also improves Chinese state-owned assets management system. What is more, it makes Chinese state-owned enterprises gradually quit from the competition, improves the independent innovation capability of Chinese state-owned enterprises, uses of market mechanism to allocate the control right of Chinese state-owned enterprises.