The Rent Dissipation Research Of Farmland Commercial Allocation

The basic way of china's farmland commercial allocation is that the country first levy ruralcollective land, transforming land ownership into state-owned, and then the local government—theactual controllers of land ownership will transfer land use right to commercial real estate developersin the bidding, auction or listing way,thus to complete the process of farmland commercial allocation.Due to the existence of externalities and own defects,the immature or inadequacy ways of landexpropriation and transfer system,especially the local government to use its the only legal statu ofbuyer monopoly position of demand-side to control land expropriation price in the process of ruralland expropriation,and rely on its the only legal status of seller monopoly position of supply–side tointervene commercial land transfer price in the process of commercial land transfer,our countryfarmland commercial allocation process exists not only market failure, and government failure there.The existence of market failure and government failure completely emerge deviation betweenfarmland commercial allocation of transformation period and the optimal path of completelycompetitive period,This is seen through "the price difference" expression,and the land resources " of"the price difference" belong to the public resources, namely for land rent value. The formation ofland rent has the market failure factors, but the more important reason is that:the collective "cheapprovide " the government its land ownership (whole property right bundle) under the situationcompulsively collected land according to law, and the government in the land for commercial use,only transfer state-owned land use (relative property right bundle)to commercial real estatedevelopers,and then produce unequal economic relations of property right bewteen the collective landownership and the state-owned land use right in land circulation.In this unequal economic relations ofproperty right, the government often use a very low price collective with privileges t to collectcollective land, and then times over commercial real estate developers with several times even dozensof times, and the price difference between the two is the land rent value, almost all government owned.As the government itself is not only the "economic man" and "the government",they won't forcerestricting their own actions,the more exciting its low motivation of land expropriation, and the lowerthe price of the government land expropriation,and the greater the local government get land rentvalue under the condition of commercial land transfer prices nvariabilityOf course, the land rent valuehas a variety of produce forms, reflected not only in the tax on farmland market, and is also present incommercial land on the market, the more present in between the linkage market rural landexpropriation and commercial land transfer.The existence of land rent value will lure related economic benefit main body tostrive for it through the various legal or illegal means (mainly refers to the set rent,rent-seeking,collusion,etc),and the cost need deduction from the land rent value ofStaying segmentation, and this will cause that the land rent value is divided, transfer andincreased, and and cause serious waste of land resources and social welfare loss. Landrent value dissipation is that the government in the market period of lift intervene orprevent the price mechanism of the product or resources distribution so that cause thebenefit of the loss,this is because that the economic subject will be looking for otherresources allocation standard,and as a substitute mechanism in the land price system ofgovernment intervention.This cause a cost, this is because that other resources distribution can not totally free, and the cost is the land rent dissipation value. In theprocess of farmland commercial allocation, related economic subject strive for land rentvalue behavior can cause land rent value dissipationg,but often not dissipate to zero, thedirect cause is: the rent-seeking expected profit of rent seekers depends on the marginalcost of land rent with the marginal rent value of land, and the root cause is: relatedeconomic subject will minimize land rent value dissipationg through all sorts of efforts inthe constraint conditions...