Research On Dual-channel Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism In E-commerce

With the rapid development of E-Commerce, Internet as a sales channel has received much attention from both academia and industry. Companies have set up electronic direct channel one after another in order to reduce costs and expand market. However, the manufacturer is both supplier and direct competitor to the retailer as the existence of traditional channel and electronic direct channel in a dual channel supply chain. This dual role leads to channel conflicts and begins to draw increasing notice. Moreover, the dual-channel channel coordination mechanisms have a significant effect on the success of supply chain management in E-Commerce. Therefore, aiming at two-echelon dual-channel supply chain and by using optimization theory, non-cooperative game theory and stochastic inventory theory, this dissertation studied on how to coordinate supply chain and achieve win-win situation between supply chain members by designing contracts. As a result, the competitive advantage of the entire supply chain's enhanced in the global economy of Internet age.First of all, assuming that there is a linear relationship between the product price and the market demand, this paper analyzed and compared the optimal pricing strategies in the integrated and decentralized manners of the dual-channel supply chain. With respect to the cooperation between the electronic channel and traditional channel, two-way revenue sharing contracts and price discount are designed to study on dual-channel supply chain coordination. And a dynamic game model is developed to demonstrate that these contracts form an effective intrinsic incentive mechanism, and ensure a"win-win"situation between supply chain members in some cases. Besides, a numerical example is presented to illustrate these contracts have good properties and high efficiency.Secondly, among previous dual-channel supply chain studies, inventory competition and coordination problem with random demand are relatively lack of research. Therefore, our manuscript focused on this issue from the perspective of demand transferring. In this paper, A dynamic game model and stochastic inventory model are developed to demonstrate that the shared-savings contract can effectively coordinate the benefit conflicts, achieve a win-win outcome and improve the profit of the system. In the end, numerical example has been used to further confirm both contracts have excellent properties and high efficiency. Finally, based on the former studies, companies have to consider risk tolerance while maximizing profits. Particularly, some companies even prefer sacrificing part of the revenue to avoiding risks. In order to better simulate and explain the reality, we assumed that manufacturers and retailers are both risk averse. Under this assumption, two-way revenue sharing contracts, price discount mechanism and how to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain are all investigated. The dynamic game model and mean–variance model are developed to demonstrate that the shared-savings contract can effectively coordinate the benefit conflicts, achieve a win-win outcome and improve the profit of the system. Furthermore, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the risk-averse's impact on optimal strategy and contract parameters, the effectiveness of the contracts are also verified.