Research On Coordination Mechanism In A Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering Members' Behaviors

Recently, with the rapid development of the internet, there are more and more traditional enterprises choosing to open an online channel to participate into the marketing directly. The so-called dual-channel strategy has intensified the marketing competition significantly, which makes the environment of the market become more complex and fill with more uncertainty. At the same time, a lot of experimental findings and real-life observations have indicated that companies may not only concentrate on monetary payoffs but also be concerned with fair outcomes, risk averse and the like in business relationships. Therefore, in this dissertation, we assume the managers have fairness concerns or risk-averse attitude in a dual channel supply chain and adopt optimization theory, game theory to explore how the behaviors impact on the advertising strategy, pricing strategy and channel selection strategy respectively.Firstly, we consider a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer acts as the Stackelberg game leader and the manufacturer is follower. Both the two members have fairness concerns and they adopt co-op advertising strategy. Assuming the supply chain without fairness as a benchmark, we explore three scenarios where both the two members have fairness or only one part has fairness. The results show that the fairness concerns of the manufacturer and the retailer have a significant impact on the advertising effort, the participation rate and the profits. The empirical study further illustrates the degree of the impact of the fairness on the profits. Further,because of the marketing demand is full of uncertainty and the retailer has a limited tolerance to the risk, we also study a two-echelon supply chain where the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is risk-averse. Assuming the manufacturer is acting as the Stackelberg game leader and the retailer adopts CVaR(conditional value at risk) method as the risk measure tool. We consider the manufacturer has two selections to distribute the product, one is only through the traditional channel and the other is through the dual channel. We are focusing on exploring the impact of the retailer's risk-averse attitude and the degree of the marketing demand uncertainty on the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the entire supply chain. Besides, the profits in the two scenarios are compared specifically. Finally, a revenue sharing contract is adopted to coordinate the dual channel supply chain and both the two agents get a win-win outcome.