Intellectual Property Rights, International Trade And Economic Growth

In the era of technology economy, the power of continuing economic growthcomes from technological improvement as well as the technology-driven protectionsystem. Owing to the properties of nonexcludability and positive externality, suchproduct as intellectual property rights needs certain protection system to ensure itscirculation in the market. The establishment of the TRIPS is conducive to clear awaythe obstacles to the global flow of intellectual property rights. Therefore, in thebackground of knowledge economy, intellectual property rights and the internationaltrade have significant effects on economic growth. According to the logic organization,the paper is divided into six chapters, the concrete content as follows:When talking about the relationship of intellectual property rights, internationaltrade and economic growth, the paper have some conclusion,as follow: First, theintellectual property system is not the only impact of sustainable economic growthfactors, but reasonable, modest intellectual property system is absolutely an essentialcondition of sustainable economic growth. Second, reasonable, appropriateintellectual property system promotes economic growth; demand on the intellectualproperty system will change at different stages of economic growth. In the mechanismof the interaction of intellectual property rights and economic growth, coordination ofrelevant trade policy is the necessary condition; immoderate trade policy will restrictthe economic growth effects of intellectual property system. Again, the leadingeconomies and catching up economy should take a different intellectual propertyrights and trade policy to promote sustainable economic growth. Finally, it is worthnoting that the leading countries are removed the ladder of economic development,developing countries face more severe challenges on the road to catch up.The first chapter is an introduction. Besides a general introduction, this chaptertraces course of the research and development on the intellectual property rights, the international trade and the economic growth. Then we conclude that intellectualproperty rights, the international trade and economic growth constitutes a two-wayinteraction between each other. As a motivator of technology innovation, neither theinadequate nor the excessive protection of intellectual property rights will benefit thetechnological progress and the economic growth. When the first time addressed,intellectual property rights has a natural link with the international trade, and therelevance between them is enhanced, along with the technological progress. Being theresults of the technological progress, economic growth has an influence on intellectualproperty system and trade policies undoubtedly.The second chapter, which is based on the endogenous growth theory and usemethods of the dynamic general equilibrium analysis and game analysis, illustratesthe research on the relationship among intellectual property rights, international tradeand economic growth And this chapter is divided into three parts. First of all, as theconclusion of dynamic general equilibrium analysis shows, given the constanttechnology innovation rate , the northern economy with advanced in technology andthe south economy which is backward in technology and without the ability ofindependent innovation are the completive relationship, any improvement of one'sterms of trade means the loss that the other suffers. If the south carries out morerigorous intellectual property protection system, the only influence should be todamage the competition mechanism on the whole and slow the economic growth rate.Second, referring to the issue that whether TRIPS is a better protection system for theintellectual property rights, we draw the conclusion that an symmetric protectionsystem of intellectual property protection system is better than an asymmetricintellectual property rights, basing on an analytical framework built from Taylormodel. However, in view of the unrealistic assumptions of Taylor model, I havereservations about this conclusion. Finally, in a repeatedly gaming model framework,the southern government is unable to achieve the optimal choice--- abandoning theprotection of the intellectual property rights. Therefore, the ultimate intensity of theintellectual property protection of the south is a suboptimal choice, responsive to the technological progress of the north driven by R&D and investment.The third chapter is to study the relationship among intellectual property rights,the international trade and economic growth in the long term, basing on the analyticalmethods of the institutional economics. In this chapter, the writer studies theoreticallyon the influence of the intellectual property protection system and trade policy ontechnological changes and economic growth. First, policies and institutions decide thedevelopment path of technology and the pattern of economic growth. Taking accountof that the protection of Intellectual property is institutional arrangements for acountry to introduce advanced technology; the arrangements are based onunobstructed diplomatic channels in which trade policies play a decisive role. Second,in the background of transnational flow, as the product of flourishing trade, the propertype of intellectual property system varies with technical changes. Finally, in the roadseeking economic growth, the leading countries and less developed countries have themutual influence and are suitable for different policies.The fourth chapter is some historical inspections to the theory. This chapterchooses the leading economies as the research sample. the first part analyzes theworld before the rise of Britain, not only to explain the roles intellectual propertyrights and trade policy played in the process of the rapid rise and fall of Portugal andSpain, but to answer the mystery of Venice's decline ,the birthplace of intellectualproperty system. The second part analyzes terms of trade and the intellectual propertysystem during the rise of Britain, taking time as clues. The third part is about theUnited States. The overtaking process is very complicated, that the United Statesdevelops from a young nation independent of former colonial possessions to a leadingeconomy maintaining the first-chair of the world in the field of technology up to now.In United States, setting the establishment of intellectual property protection as thewater shed line, we can clearly see the obvious impact of intellectual property systemand trade-related conditions in the economic growth and the technical changes.The fifth chapter chooses the catching-up economies as the research sample. Wefocuses on Japan and Korea. In the first part,the overtaking process of Japan is a process of constantly technology introduction, digestion and resorption. During theprocess of catching up and succeeding, intellectual property system and trade policiesare changing accordingly. From the experiences of the above countries, we find thatintentionally leading the changing of technology and reasonably applying propertysystem and trade policies have decisive effects for a country to overtake successfully.In the second part,we talking about Korean successful catching-up. Koreanexperience in a very short time before it became a developed country. Withoutexternal factors can't be replicated, small internal markets and economies with thestrong protectionist trade policies for domestic firms'development opportunities. Ifthe channels of technology transfer is smooth, a combination of intellectual propertysystem with strong patent protection and weak utility model patent protection, is infavor of domestic technological progress and sustained economic growth.The last Chapter is conclusions. by analysising Chinese intellectual propertyregime after founding, we found China is facing challenges in intellectual propertyregime, international trade policy and economic growth.so, several policyrecommendations are needed.