Game Analyses In Grain And Agriculture Institutions' Supply

The problem of grain in China is a very important thing. Our country has not much arable land, but the biggest population in the world, and it still belongs to developing countries. The above are the basic features of performance system of the grain economy. The lack of grain often influences the whole national economy so that the problems of social safety and government stability rise. The surplus of grain makes too much stock of grain stay in the storehouses of the government owned grain firms, and the budget payment burden heavily presses the shoulders of the government. The grain demand in China has been stably increased along with the development of the economy and the increase of the population. Although this sort of the increasing process of the demand is so slow that it seems nothing felt for one year or two, there is a huge amount for a little longer time. The tremendous grain demand will challenge the ability of grain production in a not long future.Supply or innovation of institutions is one of ways to solve the grain problem in China. China had trouble with grain shortage for a long time before the policy of "reform and openness", and per capita output of grain had always been about 300 kilograms or so for twenty-seven years. In 1978, the economic reform began in China, and the first institutional reform policy, the household responsibility system has given a very good performance. The farmers worked hard, produced more and more grain for successive seven years, and made per capita output of grain reached 392.8 kilograms in 1984. The first grain surplus appeared after the new China had been set up. The household responsibility system has determined that the direction of grain economy system reform ought to be to market from plan control, and it has supported the grain balance between supply and demand for about twenty years. The deep significance of household responsibility system in the rural area goes beyond the kingdom of grain, agriculture and rural economy. However, the current grain economy system is not performing very well and still has some faults. To reduce the fluctuations of grain output, to meet the gigantic demand in future, and to solve the problems of dynamic grain balance between supply and demand, and grain security for a long run time, it is necessary to continue to push forward the reform of grain economy system and complete it.This research has used the analysis tools of modern economics, statistical positive methodand assumptions-deduction mathematics method, so that theory discussions could be standa(?)d(?)zed,logistic relationship between assumptions or conditions and their outcomes could be more clear, viewpoints and opinions could be put on a scientific basement and, paradox and ambiguity could be avoided as possible. Positive research methods have been extensively accepted by economists in China. Whereas the assumptions-deduction mathematics methods, especially game theory, have just been introduced into China, which are unfamiliar to most Chinese economists. This research is a try to systematically use game theory to analyze the problem of institutions supply for the China's grain or agricultural economy. However, it is fortunate that some results of the research have been published.The simple introductions of chapters in the research dissertation are given one by one as follows.The chapter one and two are a preparatory work for the research. The chapter one tries to make the key of the grain problem in China clear. It reviews the history and current situation of the grain development, provides the background knowledge for the China's grain problem, predicts change trend of the grain demand, and summarizes the embarrassments confronted by the grain economy. The chapter two states the general principles of new institutions economics thought as a theoretical start point studying the grain problem in China, reviews the institutions change process in the agricultural economy, analyses the relationship between institutions innovations and technique progress, and discusses the targets and particularities of grain production.This research's contributions mainly appear in the chapters three to eight. The chapter three is a statistical positive analysis which takes out the trend from the series of the China's annual grain output, analyses the fluctuations of grain output with the spectra method, explores the separate waves piling up each other and, exposes the traces left by economic institutions changes in the China's agricultural historical development. The chapter four sets up and employs some models of game theory and information economics and with them compares the performances of equal pay for each farmer, more pay more hard work in a labor collective and household responsibility system under the different conditions whether the interest of monitors exists and whether information is perfect or complete; the last part also compares the performances of individual farmer, a cooperative and an industrial head corporation in the field of extensive agriculture, such as farm products' transportation, manufacture and sale, supply of agricultural production means, and service of agricultural techniques and credit. The chapter five makes statistical test to detect the effect of household responsibility system, which shows that the system has produced an active and deep influences on grain production, agriculture, rural economy, and even the whole national economy not only during the earlier part of "reform and openness" time, but also the recent part. Based on incomplete contract property rights theory, the chapter six does a mechanism design on the distribution of property rights about cultured land—the means of grain production, which deduces the request enforcing the farmers' surplus control right on cultured land. In the chapter seven, firstly, conducting effect of grain purchase price signals on the production decisions of farmers is tested, which shows that although the Chinese fanners have a strong tendency of self supply, they are still economic persons, could usually respond on the grain price change, and yearn to maximize themselves' utilities, and the government must consider the farmers' response when it regulates the grain balance between supply and demand with the price lever. Secondly, two game models are set up to analyze mutual relationships between the government and farmers. Finally, the optimized policy of grain purchase price for the government is discussed. With maximized, compieie and incompiete dynamic game models, the chapter eight gives a device of the market structure of grain purchase for the future, from which the result obtained is that the market in China should be the model of buyer's oligopoly competition. This kind market structure would be good to enhance the inner exciting mechanism of grain purchase firms, to increase the farmers' income, to improve the consumer's interest, to reduce the government regulation cost, to support grain security and to stabilize grain supply.