Research On The Coordination Of Capacity Cooperation In Logistics Service Supply Chain

Service supply chain (SSC) is a new research trend in the field of supply chain, while logistics service supply chain (LSSC) is an important branch of SSC. As a prospective development trend, LSSC is one of the hot points in the field of logistics research.LSSC is formed as long as the development of logistics industry. LSSC is a new supply chain of which logistics service integrator (LSI) is the core enterprise. The basic structure of LSSC is: functional logistics service provider (FLSP)→LSI→customer. The main purpose of LSSC is to provide the flexible logistics service for product supply chain. LSSC is a supply chain based essentially on the capacity cooperation. Therefore, doing research on the motivation and coordination method will not only improve the performance of LSSC but also have practical policy-guiding significance for logistics industry.In this paper, the LSSC's forming reasons, structure and essence were discussed. From the literature review, with the rise of product service and service outsourcing, the research on supply chain is turning from product supply chain to SSC, SSC is becoming a new research trend. After analysing logistics capacity from the domestic and abroad literature, the definition and measurement of logistics capacity was given in this paper. Then, the logistics service development history was discussed by the work dividing theory. The forming reason model of LSSC was put forward. The economic analysis of capacity cooperation in two-echelon LSSC was also made by logistics boundary theory. Two-echelon and multi-echelon structure of LSSC were brought out. Three important factors which determine the length of LSSC were presented. In order to understand the capacity cooperation status of LSSC in China today, a logistics enterprises survey was made. Results from survey shows that capacity cooperation is important in LSSC and capacity cooperation will benefit logistics service operation while some risks of capacity cooperation in LSSC exist. Consequently, it is very significant for the capacity coordination research method in LSSC.As a key part of capacity coordination, before starting the capacity coordination, how to make order allocation when one LSI faces many FLSPs was discussed firstly. Considering the importance of FLSP and indeterminate environment, an order allocation model facing many LSIs in two-echelon LSSC was built in this paper. An order allocation model based on the single logistics capacity was given firstly, then, an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (without capacities matching constraint) was also proposed. Further, an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (with capacities matching constraint) was brought out, and an order allocation model based on the multiplicate logistics capacities (with better capacities matching constraint) was also advanced. These models discussed above are multi-aim plan problems. The detailed solution methods were provided and model solutions were put forward as well. The results shows that with the augmentation of indeterminate environment, the cost of LSI will rise, the general satisfaction degree of FLSP will fall and the general punishment intensity of FLSP will increase. The relationship cost coefficientδhas close connection with the satisfaction degree and punishment intensity of FLSP. With the enlargement ofδ, the satisfaction degree will increase while punishment intensity will decrease.After order allocation was discussed, quantity coordination of capacity cooperation in two-echelon LSSC was analyzed in detail. Firstly, the research on status of capacity cooperation in supply chain was given. And the upriver and downriver capacity cooperation types of LSSC were put forward. The capacity coordination was divided into six types as with/without capacities matching constraints and three cooperation models (including loose cooperation, infirm strategy cooperation and strong strategy cooperation). On the basis of the former researches, the capacity coordination modelⅠ(without capacities matching constraints and infirm strategy cooperation) under the Stackelberg decision in two-echelon LSSC was analyzed. The cost model of LSI and profit model of FLSP were brought out. Then, the capacity coordination modelⅡ(with capacities matching constraints and infirm strategy cooperation), the capacity coordination modelⅢ(without capacities matching constraints and strong strategy cooperation) and the capacity coordination modelⅣ(with capacities matching constraints and strong strategy cooperation) were also put forward. The solution method of these four coordination models under indeterminate environment was proposed. Data simulation was carried out by the software MATLAB 7.0. The coordination results were given. The four coordination results under four coordination types were compared. The coordination result under combination decision was compared with the result under Stackelberg decision. It was founded that the general profit under combination decision is superior to that under Stackelberg decision.During the course of capacity cooperation, logistics service quality supervision and control is very important. Therefore, the quality control and coordination of logistics capacity cooperation in logistics service supply chain is studied. Considering that a two-echelon LSSC includs a logistic service integrator and a supplier and considering the measureless characteristic of service product, this paper established a basic game theoretic model (modelⅠ) for quality supervision of capacity cooperation. In the model LSI can choose to make quality supervision or not, and FLSP can accomplish the task according to the quality contact or choose to cheat. The paper presented the result of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium firstly, discussed the modelⅡin multi-echelon quality coordination when LSI is being punished. Then, the modelⅢconsidered the influence on quality coordination which is caused by the competitions between FLSP. At last, the modelⅣwith the matching capacities was also put forward. Then, the new results of the Nash equilibrium for those models above were given. As a key part of quality control, the coordination, quality evaluation & decision and its three models in LSSC were analyzed. A practical example was given to identify its application. Based on the analysis above, this paper proposed the suggestions about how to intensify the quality coordination and finally gave the conclusions.After the capacity cooperation, rational profit distribution is very significant for long-term stable operation in LSSC. Research on the choice of profit distribution mechanism in the two- echelon LSSC was made on the basis of former researches. Three profit distribution mechanisms (including sharing profit distribution mechanism, fixed profit distribution mechanism and mixed profit distribution mechanism) used in the two-echelon LSSC were summarized and literatures were reviewed in this chapter. This chapter considered the two-echelon LSSC consisting of a manufacturer and a seller. Based on the principle-agent theory, the mixed profit distribution mechanism model was expressed. The result of this model shows the distribution coefficient is a function of the risk aversion coefficient. Then, the sharing profit distribution mechanism model and fixed profit distribution mechanism model were also discussed. The transition conditions among three mechanisms were put forward in this paper. The transition condition between mixed profit distribution mechanism and sharing profit distribution mechanism is that distribution coefficient is equal to 0.5. The transition condition between fixed profit distribution mechanism and sharing profit distribution mechanism is that fixed profit must suit to a certain condition. At last, how to choose the profit distribution mechanism under different cooperation conditions was proposed in detail. Based on the mixed profit distribution mechanism, this paper extended it in more general case. When LSSC has a LSI and many FLSPs and one's effect is affected by others' endeavor, this paper gives the optimization distribution coefficient and fixed payment by the principle-agent theory. A practical example was given to identify its application.Case study method was used in this dissertation. How to manage the transportation resource supplier and improve the service quality in Tianjin Baoyun logistics Co.Ltd was analyzed in detail. What's more, how to integrate the social resources by multiple profit distribution model in Luneng Fanmao logistics Co.ltd was also discussed. Case studies show that it was well consonant with the theories provided in this paper.Finally, the main conclusion and future researche prospect were given.