Theories Of Delegation Based On Specific Information And Strategic Competition

Efficient delegation within an organization can help to avoid errors in decision-making, save senior managers' time and energy, motivate subordinates, improve the flexibility of the organization, and therefore enhance the its competitive advantage. While inefficient delegation may bring about waste of scare resources, make the organization suffer loss, and even result in its breakdown.With the gradual perfection of China's socialism market economy system and improvement in the degree of its economic opening, economic agents face greater competitive pressure than before. In this background, understanding delegation properly and using it efficiently have obvious theoretical and practical value for people and organizations in markets.This dissertation surveyed extensively the representative literature on the study of the economic theories of delegation, clarified the thread of relevant studies. Using game theory and incentives theory as analytic tools, we studied the following problems:1. By for the first time explicitly considering both the benefit from specialization and the efficient exploitation of specific information, we studied the principal's delegation decision, and analyzed the effects of various parameters on the threshold of the quality of the specific information for delegation to occur.2. We initiated the notion of strategic delegation equilibrium, detailed the conditions for strategic delegation equilibrium to occur. This study makes the usual strategic delegation model more complete.3. For the four kinds of most-often-used licensing mechanisms, we studied for every mechanism the impact of strategic delegation on the optimal licensing policy, and then, for different types of innovation, investigated its impact on the patent holder's choice of the optimal licensing mechanism, the degree of the diffusion of patented technology, and the level of social welfare. Our study complements existing literatures.4. We investigated the implementation effects of regulation policies when the government delegated its officer to monitor the pollution level of the firm, and studied how the government can achieve its objective in environmental regulation through appropriate tools (such as penalizing heavily the monitor's loses to duty, decreasing the monitoring cost, or improving the bargaining power of the monitor relative the firm owner).